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Abstract
According to the “cost efficiency - liquidity creation” hypothesis (CELCH), in-
troduced in this paper, a rise in a bank’s cost efficiency level increases its liquidity
creation. By employing a novel stress test scenario under a panel VAR methodology,
the CELCH and the direction of causality between liquidity creation and cost effi-
ciency are tested. Moreover, using new measures of liquidity creation (Berger and
Bouwman 2009), the question of whether potential bank mergers and acquisitions
(M&As) can enhance liquidity creation and generate additional credit channels in
the economy is addressed. The robustness of potential consolidation scenarios are
evaluated and compared through the use of new “half-life” measures (Chortareas
and Kapetanios 2013). In line with CELCH, the positive impact of cost efficiency on
liquidity creation is shown. The empirical evidence further suggests that potential
consolidation activity can enhance the flow of credit in the economy. Bank shocks
seem to have the most persistent effect on both liquidity creation and cost efficiency.
Finally, doubts are cast on the strategies followed by policy authorities regarding
the recent wave of M&As in the banking sector.
Keywords: bank distress; liquidity risk; efficiency; capital structure; regulation;
M&As; PVAR
JEL classification: G21, G28, G32, G34
1 Introduction
The challenge of safeguarding financial stability has become even
more vital in light of the rapidly evolving global financial environment, which is char-
acterized by enhanced financial liberalization and integration, rapid development of new
financial products and technologies, consolidation in the banking industry, and increasing
competition. Throughout the global financial crisis, many banks struggled to maintain
adequate liquidity. Consequently, creating substantial liquidity buffers across the board is
the explicit aim of a number of regulatory responses to the crisis, such as the Committee
of European Banking Supervisors’ (CEBS) guidelines on liquidity buffers (CEBS 2009b)
and the forthcoming Basel III liquidity standards, the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR),
and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR). These all exert additional pressure on banks to
effectively manage their liquidity, while ensuring a high level of efficiency.
The recent financial crisis underscored the importance of having a better understand-
ing of the ways that liquidity conditions influence credit extension to domestic and foreign
customers. Before the financial turmoil occurred, bank liquidity came quite often from
abroad (i.e. capital and money markets) due to the incapability of domestic deposits to
support the large expansion in credit growth. Currently, it is difficult for new liquidity
to come from abroad, especially in countries where the recession is still accelerating and
the value of collateralized assets is decreasing . Consequently, in periods of contracting
2
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
economies when investment opportunities are limited because funding sources are scarce,
any funding possibility (i.e. loan expansion) must be created within the country itself.
This requires certain domestic policy actions to be taken, such as reducing reserve re-
quirements, increasing capital in state-owned banks, increasing the minimum insurance
on bank deposits, or coming to terms with the mechanisms of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). Thus, investigation of different possibilities to increase the credit channels
in the economy is of primary concern for governments and policy authorities, especially
in countries with a high level of sovereign debt and default risk.
With this in mind, we contribute to the literature by conducting, to the best of our
knowledge, the first combined theoretical and empirical study that links efficiency to
liquidity. We investigate the concept of potential consolidation activity among banks
and address whether it can lead to an increase of liquidity in the banking sector and
consequently increase the credit channels in the economy, especially in countries with
a high level of sovereign debt and severe country default risk. This leads us to the
following two prerequisites: the first raises concerns that a potential consolidation activity
in the banking sector increases concentration in the system and may cause anticompetitive
effects with a negative impact on social well-being. The second addresses the issue of how
we will measure liquidity with respect to potential bank M&As in the future. For this
purpose, the “cost efficiency - liquidity creation” hypothesis (CELCH) is proposed to
measure the liquidity creation of a potential bank consolidation activity through its level
of efficiency. The CELCH argues that after a consolidation activity, if the new financial
institution generates cost efficiency gains, these can be reflected in both liquidity creation
enhancement and a sounder banking system. Both the US and EU merger guidelines
explicitly note that the criterion for judging potential mergers acceptable is their ability
to create merger-specific efficiency gains and pass them on to customers. Thus, the
CELCH has both theoretical and empirical foundations.
Nevertheless, the result of an increase in both liquidity creation and stability of the
banking sector via potential cost-efficient bank M&As can lose its significance if these
positive outcomes vanish when adverse economic conditions occur in the future. From
this perspective, this is the first study to address the impact of potential adverse eco-
nomic conditions on liquidity creation and cost efficiency in an economy. To this end,
a stress test under a panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) methodology is created, where
two completely different, in terms of sophistication, market characteristics and volume of
transactions, banking systems are examined by imposing macroeconomic, financial, and
bank-specific shocks.1 This is of extreme importance, considering the anticompetitive con-
sequences that could result from a potential consolidation activity. We are able to provide
1We apply the stress test under the PVAR methodology in two polar cases (i.e. two completely
different banking systems) in order to test and amplify the validity of our inferences.
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inferences on the contribution of each specific prospective M&A to the robustness of each
country’s banking sector with respect to both liquidity creation and cost efficiency, and
consequently, on whether each consolidation should be realized from both an economic
and a social perspective in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis. This leads to
the third novelty of our study; via the PVAR framework, we investigate the impact of
efficiency on liquidity creation and the direction of causality among these two economic
variables. Moreover, we are able to empirically examine the CELCH. The final contri-
bution of the present study is the proposition of an innovative methodology to evaluate
and compare the robustness of each potential bank M&A scenario through recent half-life
measures (Chortareas and Kapetanios 2013). It is worth noting that this methodology
can be used to evaluate and compare the performance of firms and individuals in any
industry (e.g., energy, labor, food) and enable regulatory authorities to extract important
policy implications, particularly in an era of on-going economic and financial turbulence
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.
First, we focus our attention on the UK banking system, which is very complex with an
advanced capital market. Its financial institutions have expanded their roles beyond their
traditional payment services, intermediation between savers and borrowers, and insurance
against risk function by adopting a more universal type of banking. The members of the
UK banking system are of major importance to public authorities, as they were among
the first credit institutions to suffer the impact of the recent global financial meltdown. It
is noteworthy that two of the four big-banks of the UK banking sector, specifically Lloyds
and RBS faced severe liquidity problems. Thus, the first main reason that we investigate
the UK banking sector is due to the fact that the consequences of the crisis were severe not
only for the UK’s public finances and capital market but also for the financial segments
and public sectors of countries with which UK financial institutions are interconnected.
This becomes clear if one looks at the £550 billion UK government intervention following
two bank rescue packages in 2008 and 2009 via the Special Liquidity Scheme and the Bank
Recapitalization Fund. Additionally, monetary authorities intervened by lowering interest
rates to 0.5%, a figure which at the time of writing remains unchanged. Nevertheless, the
UK economy itself confronted tremendous problems of liquidity as a consequence of the
recent financial turmoil. The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) recognizes that the bank
rate cannot be reduced any further, and to provide additional stimulus to the economy, it
has undertaken unconventional monetary action. Specifically, the Bank of England (BoE)
has committed £375 billion to its asset purchasing program (quantitative easing) to date.
With this in mind, via the suggested in the paper CELCH we propose an alternative way
in boosting both the banking’s sector and in extend the overall economy’s level of liquidity
creation. This could be proven vital in reducing the scale of unconventional monetary
activities.
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The second country of interest is Greece, where the stability of its simpler banking
sector and its role as a financial intermediary has been distorted by the financial turmoil.
Before the crisis, Greek banks were unequivocally seen as well-managed and prudent,
which can be justified by the fact they did not experience severe consequences after the
first wave of the financial crisis that was escalated by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in
September, 2008. Nevertheless, the picture changed when the second wave of the global
economic crisis, the Sovereign Debt Crisis, hit. As in the case of the UK, fiscal authorities
intervened and tried to recapitalize Greek banks.2 However, that was not enough for the
Greek banks to withstand the augmented and more frequent cracks from the debt crisis, as
they were the main holders of the so-called toxic government bonds whose value decreases
every day. In turn, the more the increase in the country’s public debt, the more fragile the
nation’s banks become.3 The Bank of Greece, in close cooperation with the Troika (i.e.
the tripartite committee led by the European Commission (Eurogroup) with the European
Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund) set out to create a viable and well-
capitalized banking sector, recognizing that it would play a fundamental role in steering
the economy. Their strategy aimed at creating well-capitalized banks, new confidence for
depositors, and renewed access to capital markets so that Greek banks could return to their
basic role of financing the Greek economy. This resulted in a series of M&As until the end
of 2013. With this in mind, the reason that we examine Greece is due to the recent wave
of M&As that took place in the country’s banking sector and lead to the creation of the
four so called “Systemic” banks. These four banks were assigned the role of sustaining and
promoting the Greek economy and their recapitalization process through the European
Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) and the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF).Thus,
in this study we are interested in investigating whether these four “Systemic” banks did
indeed create cost efficiency synergies and liquidity creation enhancement that could lead
to economic growth.
The fundamental differences in the structure and the impact that the global financial
turmoil had on the two disparate banking systems triggered our motivation to conduct
comparative and forecasting pre-crisis and post-crisis analyses. The CELCH is suggested
as an alternative solution in situations where liquidity problems are quite alarming. Dur-
ing these periods we observe waves of consolidation activity in the banking sector as the
2In October, 2008, the Greek government announced a e28 billion support package for Greek banks
consisting of e5 billion worth of capital injections as far as a recapitalization scheme was concerned, e15
billion in state loan guarantees to credit institutions with varying maturity from three months up to three
years for the banking system to meet its liquidity needs, and e8 billion worth of liquidity in the form
of special bonds with maturity up to three years to be used as collateral to the Eurosystem and/or the
interbank market for any credit provided by them.
3That led to two bailout deals, one in May 2010 (e110 billion) and one in February 2012 (e130
billion), that were agreed upon between Greece and both the Eurozone countries and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).
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management’s solution to reduce the costs. On one hand, we exploit whether prospective
M&As in the UK and Greek banking systems can enhance households and firms with
the creation of additional credit channels4 in the context of a severe contraction of the
country’s economic activity; on the other hand, we shed light on the trade-off between
managerial motives and social economic surplus that triggers M&A activity. In this way,
we are able to deduce some common policy implications for both the UK and Greece in
line with recent debates regarding the creation of a unique European banking regulatory
framework, the so-called CRD IV5 package of the European Banking Authority (EBA).
The empirical evidence presented from the stress test scenario confirms the proposed
CELCH in two ways: first, by the estimated positive impact of cost efficiency on liquidity
creation, and second, by the fact that bank shocks, specifically the level of non-performing
loans in the sector, have the more persistent effect and account for most of the deviations
of the forecasted values of both the cost efficiency and liquidity creation variables from
their true levels. The causality between these two variables of interest runs stronger from
liquidity creation toward cost efficiency than vice versa . Overall, the UK banking sector
seeks to be more robust than the Greek banking sector when adverse conditions occur
in the economy. Through the proposed CELCH, we provide evidence in both countries
of increased liquidity that is created after potential M&A activity between either two or
three banking institutions in both the pre-crisis and post-crisis eras, with considerably
stronger evidence for the former period. In addition, in both periods and in both banking
systems, the highest liquidity derived from potential consolidation activity is due to large
financial institutions. Finally, we note that the impact of adverse macroeconomic and
bank-specific conditions on the Greek banking sector’s liquidity creation is greater in its
current systemic formation than it was prior to the recent wave of M&As. This finding
casts doubt on the decisions of both the foregoing policy makers and the boards of those
banks that participated in the recent wave of bank consolidations, which resulted in the
creation of the so-called four cornerstones of the Greek economy, with respect to the
actual economic benefits that derive from these recent M&As.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the
theoretical framework and presents recent liquidity creation measures. Section 3 discusses
the empirical methodology. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the empirical
evidence. Conclusions and insights for future research are offered in the final section.
4Figures 1.a and 1.b show the annual growth rate of the volume of credit facility (i.e., loans) provided
in both the public and private sectors by the financial intermediaries operating respectively in the UK
and Greece.
5CRD IV is an EU legislative package covering prudential rules for banks, building societies, and
investment firms.
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2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 Liquidity Creation
According to the theory of financial intermediation, banks provide liquidity, and specifi-
cally, better liquidity insurance than financial markets. On one hand, banks can create
liquidity through their on-balance sheet activities by funding long term illiquid assets (e.g.,
business loans) with short term liquid liabilities (e.g., transactions deposits) (Bryant 1980;
Diamond and Dybvig 1983). In other words, banks can be liquidity providers, as they
hold illiquid assets and provide cash and demand deposits to the rest of the economy. On
the other hand, banks can enhance their liquidity provision via off-balance sheet activi-
ties through loan commitments and claims to liquid funds because, from the customer’s
perspective, the features of loan commitments are very similar to demand deposits (Holm-
strom and Tirole 1998; Kashyap et al. 2002). However, liquidity can be destroyed when
banks use illiquid liabilities or equity to finance liquid assets (e.g., treasury securities).
Consequently, they expose themselves to the risk of facing a sudden increase in deposit
withdrawals, and thus to the risk of a bank run.
In periods of crisis, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Allen and Santomero (1998) argue
that liquidity creation increases the probability of higher losses when illiquid assets are
sold to meet a sudden increase in customers’ liquidity demands. Nevertheless, Carletti et
al. (2007) argue that this risk is partially mitigated through a bank merger. The authors
note that the behavior of banks after a merger is changed by the creation of an internal
money market, a venue through which reserves can be exchanged internally. Through
this internal market, the merged bank increases the weight of its relatively illiquid assets,
which is the group of assets from which the bank can generate higher rates of return. Thus,
if a sudden increase on the liability side occurs, the bank will not have to be involved
in so-called “asset fire sales”. The reason that after a consolidation activity the bank’s
ability to increase the weight of illiquid assets is ameliorated is that M&A activity reduces
information asymmetries and enables them to screen borrowers more efficiently (Panetta
et al. 2009). This view is supported by Berger and Bouwman (2009), who demonstrate
that recently completed bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As) account for the overall
liquidity of the industry and generate the greatest growth in liquidity creation over time.
Additionally, a recent study by Pana et al. (2010) presents empirical evidence that banks
with higher levels of deposit insurance create higher levels of liquidity around mergers.
2.2 Measurement of Liquidity Creation
Liquidity creation by banks has historically been measured by the loans to asset ratio, as
shown in Hughes et al. (1996), or the ratio of cash and related liquid items to total assets,
as proxies of bank liquidity (Molyneux and Thornton 1992; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga
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1999). However, such liquidity indicators have been criticized as they do not consider
the comprehensive aspects of bank liquidity provision and the development of market
conditions connected with financial markets (Shleifer and Vishny 2010). The existing
literature indicates that there have only been two papers that attempt to measure bank
liquidity creation. The first is one by Deep and Schaefer (2004), where a measure of
liquidity transformation is constructed and applied to data gathered from 200 of the
largest US banks over the period 1997-2001. The liquidity transformation gap, or “LT
gap”, is defined as liquid liabilities minus liquid assets divided by total assets. The
authors consider all loans with a maturity of one year or less to be liquid in this model;
loan commitments and other off-balance sheet activities are explicitly excluded due to
their contingent nature. Nonetheless, to precisely measure a bank’s aggregate liquidity
supply, all aspects of the balance sheet should be considered. To be more precise, the
liquidity that a bank provides is attributed to the structure of both the asset and liability
sides, but on the other hand, is also attributed to off-balance sheet activities. This leads
us to the second methodological attempt in the literature to gauge liquidity, proposed by
Berger and Bouwman (2009). The authors claim that the “LT gap” is a step forward but
argue that it is not sufficiently comprehensive by highlighting a few differences between
their approach and the “LT gap” developed by Deep and Schaefer (2004). The Berger and
Bouwman (2009) model also classifies loans by category rather than solely by maturity and
employs measures that include off-balance sheet activities, consistent with the arguments
of Kashyap et al. (2002) and Repullo (2004).
Berger and Bouwman (2009) construct their liquidity creation measure using a three-
step approach. In the first step, they classify all bank balance sheet and off-balance
sheet activities as liquid, semi-liquid, or illiquid based on the ease, cost, and time for
banks to dispose of their obligations to obtain liquid funds to meet customers’ demands.
Within each category, shorter maturity items are defined as more liquid than longer
maturity items because they self-liquidate without as much effort. Loans are classified
by category (“cat”) or entirely by maturity (“mat”). In the second step, the authors
assign weights to the activities classified in the first step. The weights are based on the
liquidity creation theory, according to which banks create the most liquidity when they
transform illiquid assets into liquid liabilities, whereas maximum liquidity is destroyed
when liquid assets are transformed into illiquid liabilities. Therefore, positive weights
are applied to both illiquid assets and liquid liabilities and negative weights to liquid
assets and illiquid liabilities. They argue that the magnitudes of the weights are based on
simple dollar-for-dollar adding up constraints, so that $1 of liquidity is created (destroyed)
when banks transform $1 of illiquid (liquid) assets into $1 of liquid (illiquid) liabilities.
In the last step, they combine the activities as classified in the first step, and weighted
according to the second step, in order to construct four liquidity measures. These measures
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classify loans by category or maturity (“cat” vs “mat”) and differentiate on whether
banks include off-balance sheet activities (“fat”) or exclude them (“nonfat”). Thus, four
liquidity creation measures are constructed based on the four combinations: “catfat”,
“catnonfat”, “matfat”, “matnonfat”. A detailed description of the three-step procedure
is provided in table 1.
Berger and Bouwman (2009) suggest that “catfat” is the preferred liquidity creation
measure, as in this specific category, business loans can be treated as illiquid regardless
of their maturity because banks generally cannot easily dispose of them to meet liquidity
needs; residential mortgages and consumer loans can be treated as semiliquid because
these loans can often be securitized and sold to meet demand for liquid funds. In ad-
dition, this measure includes off-balance sheet activities, consistent with the arguments
in Holmston and Tirole (1998) and Kashyap et al. (2002), who suggest that banks also
create liquidity off-balance sheet through loan commitments and similar claims to liquid
funds. 6
3 Empirical Methodology
3.1 Recent & Potential M&As - “Cost Efficiency-Liquidity Cre-
ation” Hypothesis (CELCH)
The first step of our empirical strategy is to examine whether prospective banks’ M&As7
could lead to an increase of liquidity in the banking sector and in turn, to an increase
of the credit channels (i.e. loans) in the economy, especially in the spectrum of a severe
country default risk. To conduct our analysis, we create potential M&As between the
most important financial institutions in terms of assets, loans and deposits in the UK
and Greek banking sector respectively and we compare their potential liquidity creation,
computed by Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) preferred measure of liquidity creation, (i.e.
catfat), against the sum of each individual bank’s liquidity creation.
Nevertheless, this leads to the following challenge; ‘How to measure potential liquidity
creation?’. In this paper liquidity creation is measured by the recently proposed in the
literature liquidity measures of Berger and Bouwman (2009). However, the problem with
6It is noteworthy that either CATFAT or the CELCH is not related to CATFIN proposed by Allen
et al. (2012). The authors investigate whether aggregate systemic risk predicts real economic activity.
They construct monthly aggregate systemic risk from historical stock returns on U.S. financial firms. In
particular, they exploit the cross-sectional variation in individual firms’ realised stock returns within a
given month to proxy financial sector tail risk. They find that the constructed measure (termed catas-
trophic risk in the financial sector, CATFIN hereafter) predicts various real economic activity indicators
several months into the future. However, as the constructed tail risk measure relies on realised stock
returns, this measure is best regarded as a measure of realised financial sector tail risk. This may be
significantly different from the market’s forward-looking expectation of future tail risk which should be
more informative for future economic activity.
7In the case of an acquisition one financial institution takes over another one and establishes itself as
the new owner. Consequently, from a legal point of view, the target financial institution ceases to exist.
9
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
these measures is that they are constructed by an accounting rather than an estimation
procedure and consequently, we cannot calculate the liquidity creation of potential M&As.
To be more explicit, let’s assume bankA and bankB where we have data for both of them
in time t and we calculate each bank’s liquidity creation (i.e. ‘catfat’). Let’s assume now
that we create a potential consolidation activity among these two banks (bankAB) in time
t. Attempting to calculate the liquidity creation difference between the ‘new’ bank (i.e.
the merged bank) and the two ‘old’ ones (i.e. the ‘proforma’ bank8), the result will be:
difcatfat = catfatAB,t − (catfatA,t + catfatB,t) = 0 (1)
The reason that the above equation leads to a sum of zero lies on the definition of the
AB financial institution; since ‘catfatAB,t/t+1’ does not represent the liquidity creation of
a hypothetical merged bank, as it was explained above, but of a hypothetical proforma
bank since the consolidation process has not occurred historically and thus we cannot
observe its effect on the level of liquidity creation. For this reason, we introduce the “cost
efficiency - liquidity creation” hypothesis (CELCH) which states that after a consolidation
activity if the new financial institution generates cost efficiency gains these can be reflected
in liquidity creation enhancement. Thus, we propose to measure the liquidity creation of
a potential M&A through its potential level of efficiency. It is noteworthy that banks’
efficiency enhancement is an explicit policy objective in the Single Market Directive of
the European Commission, highlighting is importance.
At this point, it is important to provide a theoretical justification for our proposed
methodology. We need to explain both our theoretical motivation and testable propo-
sitions that constitute the methodological steps, which combine concepts of efficiency,
M&As, liquidity creation, and social benefit. Therefore, the following will discuss the
CELCH that states that a prospective bank consolidation activity can possibly have a
twofold contribution: the creation of a sounder banking system via the enhanced level of
efficiency and the amelioration of the social welfare via higher levels of liquidity creation
which can lead to reduced rates on bank loans for the borrowers. These methodological
steps are as follows:
• Step 1 - “For a bank-consolidation to be acceptable is to create synergies and pass
on these benefits to customers.”
During the last decade, antitrust and competition law assessment of M&As has been
altered to accommodate the growing skepticism regarding the use of concentration and
market share measures (Hausman and Sidak 2007; Werden 2002). Subsequently, a crite-
rion for judging potential mergers as acceptable is their ability to pass on merger-specific
8Proforma bank consists of the acquirer and the target one year before the M&A occurs.
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efficiency gains to customers. This efficiency pass-through criterion is explicitly stated in
the US and EU merger guidelines (Neven 2006) and is employed informally in Australia.
• Step 2 - “Bank M &As can lead to an increase in efficiency.”
Economic theory suggests that mergers can restructure an industry, and the subse-
quent efficiency gains from mergers can be larger than customer losses resulting from
increased market concentration. Theoretical studies have investigated the relationship
between merger-specific efficiency and price changes. Williamson (1968) claimed that
merger-specific cost efficiency gains outweighed possible anticompetitive effects. Within
this general framework, increased cost efficiency from mergers can be larger than the
deadweight loss of reduced production, which stems from the increase in market power.
A trade-off between efficiency gains and anticompetitive effects of M&As may be experi-
enced, as efficiency enhancement could result in a limited price increase.
• Step 3 - “Efficiency enhancing bank M &As could lead to consumer benefits.”
Farrell and Shapiro (1990) demonstrate that prices will rise if a merger generates no
synergies (efficiencies) and does not lower marginal costs. Thus, they argue that M&As
can only contribute to social well-being when efficiency has increased substantially and
when these gains are passed on to consumers. Additionally, Focarelli and Panetta (2003)
highlight that, although in the short run consolidation generates adverse price changes,
these are only temporary. Efficiency gains dominate the market power effect of mergers,
leading to prices that are more favorable for consumers.
• Step 4 - “M &As of large banks ameliorate the terms of the issuing loans from the
borrower’s point of view.”
Nonetheless, the positive effect of a consolidation process is influenced by the size of
the financial institutions involved. M&As of small banks increase the market share of
larger, more efficient banks, increasing the market’s total surplus. M&As of large banks
shift market share to smaller, less efficient banks, which need additional efficiency gains
to increase total surplus. In a recent study, Park and Pennacchi (2009) examine the
differences in pricing effects of large and small banks. Their results indicate that, as large
merging banks borrow more funds from money markets than from retail deposits, large
bank mergers will result in reduced rates for depositors and improved rates for borrowers.
• Step 5 - “Potential bank M &A activities in banking sectors in the UK and in Greece
can be proclaimed as acceptable by the Single Market Directive of the European
Commission.”
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Though DeYoung et al. (2009) show that US bank M&As have a negative impact
on efficiency, the empirical evidence these authors present reveals that European bank
M&As have a positive impact on efficiency. Moreover, Haynes and Thompson (1999)
note that UK bank mergers have been associated with positive performance effects. Ash-
ton and Pham (2007) infer that UK (and German) bank mergers have led to enhanced
cost efficiency for the merging banks. Consequently, examining potential consolidation
activities of M&As between Greek and UK banks in terms of whether they lead to in-
creased liquidity creation is in line with the established criteria of EU M&As guidelines.
Thus, prospective bank M&A activities in banking sectors in Greece and the UK can be
proclaimed as acceptable by the Single Market Directive of the European Commission.
• Step 6 - “A consolidation activity can lead to an increase in liquidity creation.”
Berger and Bouwman (2009) indicate that recently completed M&As between banks
account for the industry’s overall liquidity. Additionally, in a more recent study conducted
by Pana et al. (2010), it is it is found that banks with higher levels of deposit insurance
create higher levels of liquidity around mergers. The findings from these two studies
is justified theoretically by the fact that M&A activity reduces information asymmetries,
enables the new financial entity to screen borrowers more efficiently and, in turn, increases
the weight of illiquid assets, all of which lead to the enhancement of liquidity creation
(Panetta et al. 2009).
• Step 7 - “Cost efficiency gains can lead to increased liquidity creation”
According to the theory of economic efficiency, a financial institution can enhance its
cost efficiency if it achieves the minimum level of input costs to produce a certain level of
outputs. This is done by establishing a new business plan enabling the bank to exploit
economies of scale or economies of scope. Additionally, it can acquire or invent more
sophisticated technology to reduce its input unit cost. Alternatively, cost efficiency is
achieved by minimizing information asymmetries, which will result in the minimization
of costs. According to banking efficiency theory, loans are one of the main outputs banks
produce. The primary problem that banks face with loans is the level of those that are
non-performing.9 Nevertheless, if the bank is able to reduce its information asymmetries
then it ameliorates its ability to screen borrowers and thus reducing the level of non-
performing loans. Consequently, it can reallocate its resources and increase the weight
of loans; i.e., illiquid assets, which results in an increase in liquidity creation. Thus,
considering that consolidation activity reduces information asymmetries and results in
9A Non-performing loan (NPL) is a loan that is in default or close to being in default. Many loans
become non-performing after being in default for 90 days, but this can depend on the contract terms.
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increased liquidity (Panetta et al. 2009), we infer that the same mechanisms that lead to
cost efficiency gains lead as well to increased liquidity creation and to an increased flow
of credit to the economy.
The next challenge is to demonstrate a mathematical proof of the theory that under-
lines our proposed CELCH. To provide this proof, the hypothetical scenario of bankA,
bankB, and the potential bankAB in time t will be used once again.
To estimate the level of economic efficiency and the level cost efficiency,10 we opt for
the stochastic frontier approach (SFA)11 under the intermediation approach by Sealey and
Lindley (1977).12 In particular, we follow the specification:
lnTCit = lnC(yit, wit, T, Eit ; β) + uit + vit, (2)
where subscripts i = 1, ....N stand for each financial institution (i.e. each M&A
activity), T = .year1, year2..., final-year, indicates a time trend and is included in each
specification to allow for technological change, using both linear and quadratic (i.e. T
and T 2) respectively. TCit is individual bank total cost which is defined as the sum of
personnel and administrative expenses, interest fee and commission expenses; yit and wit
indicate vectors of output and input prices. Specifically, we specify the two mainstream
types of outputs as total loans (y1) and total earning assets (y2). However, as Stiroh
(2004) emphasizes, fee income is increasingly becoming a substitute for the revenues that
can be earned on narrowing interest margins in the classical intermediation business.
To take into consideration this development, we also account for total off-balance sheet
activities (OBS), credit commitments and derivatives, as an additional output(y3).
1314
Additionally, we specify as our three types of inputs: (1) the total intermediated funds (F ),
which consists of savings accounts, current accounts, time deposits, repurchase agreements
and alternative funding sources; (2) labor (L), which refers to the manpower involved
in the operations of all the credit institutions in the sample and (3) physical capital
10Due to unavailability of data on output prices, we do not estimate profit efficiency.
11Kubhakar and Lovell (2000) provide an excellent guide on stochastic frontier analysis and its para-
metric framework on the estimation of efficiency
12Several approaches have been suggested in the literature to define bank inputs and outputs (for a
review, see Berger and Humphrey, 1992). In our study, we are interested in the estimation of overall the
efficiency and economic viability of M&As between banks and the relationship with liquidity creation.
Thus, the intermediation approach seems to fit the purposes of our analysis (Berger and Mester 1997).
13Numerous banks around the world have broadened their portfolio to offer non-traditional services.
Additionally, OBS activities such as securitization, loan origination, derivative securities, and standby
letters of credit among others have been expanding at a rapid pace. As a result, the share of fee-based
and other non-interest income to total income has increased dramatically.
14By the inclusion of OBS activities as an additional output, we completely capture the bank output
mixes and thus avoid any spurious correlation between the cost efficiency (CE) and the liquidity creation
(LC) variable. Nevertheless, we do perform a test on its presence, and indeed, we found no evidence of
spurious correlation between the CE and the LC variable.
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depreciation and amortization (K), which consists of fixed assets, including tangible fixed
assets (land, buildings, office equipment, etc., less depreciation) and intangible assets
(software, underwriting expenses, research expenses, etc.). We measure the price of input
(w1) using the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits and short term funding and the
price of input (w2) using the ratio of staff expenses to total assets.
15 Last, we measure the
price of input (w3) using the ratio of fee and commission expenses added to administration
expenses to fixed assets. Furthermore, following Berger and Mester (1997), we specify
equity as a quasi-fixed input to control for differences in risk preferences, which may arise
due to regulation, financial distress, or informational asymmetries.16 Raising equity is
associated with higher costs than is raising deposits and the mix of these liabilities can
have a direct impact on cost (Berger and Mester, 1997). We measure (E) using the
amount of equity capital; β is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The two-sided
random error term vit is assumed to follow a normal distribution around the frontier and
uit accounts for the firm’s inefficiency and is assumed to follow a half-normal distribution
(i.e. non-negative). vit and uit are independent and independent of the regressors. To
empirically implement the cost frontier, we opt for17:
lnTCit = β0 +
3∑
l=1
βyl ln yit,l +
2∑
s=1
βws lnwit,s +
1
2
3∑
l=1
2∑
s=1
βylys ln yit,l ln yit,s
+
1
2
2∑
l=1
2∑
s=1
βwlws lnwit,l lnwit,s +
3∑
l=1
3∑
s=1
βylws ln yit,l lnwit,s
+(
2∑
s=1
βws lnwit,s) ∗ T + (
3∑
l=1
βws ln yit,l) ∗ T + βE lnEit (3)
+βtT +
1
2
βttT
2 + uit + vit
Standard linear homogeneity and symmetry restrictions in all quadratic terms are
imposed in accordance with economic theory. Efficiency values range between 0 (the least
efficient financial institution in the sample) and 1 (the most efficient financial institution
in the sample).
Attempting to calculate the difference between the level of the estimated economic
(cost) efficiency of the ‘new’ bank and of the two ‘old’ ones at the same point in time (i.e.
15In calculating (w2), we use total assets rather than the number of employees due to data unavailability.
Our approach is consistent with several other studies (e.g. Altunbas et al., 2000)
16Berger and Mester (1997) argue that not accounting for equity can result in a scale bias, while the
efficiency of banks could be miscalculated even if they behave optimally given their risk preferences.
17The translog function has been widely applied in the literature due to its flexibility. Berger and
Mester (1997) found that both the translog and the Fourier-flexible form specifications yielded essentially
the same average level and dispersion of measured efficiency, and both ranked the individual banks in
almost the same order.
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in time t) the result will be:
difeff = effAB,t − (effA,t + effB,t)
2
6= 018, (4)
because efficiency is a result of an empirical estimation procedure. Berger and Bouwman’s
(2009) liquidity measures, on the other hand, are a result of an accounting procedure,
where
catfatAB,t = (catfatA,t + catfatB,t) (5)
Thus, from equations 4 and 5 we construct the mathematical representation of our
“cost efficiency - liquidity creation” hypothesis expressed by the following equations:
If
effAB,t >
(effA,t + effB,t)
2
, (6)
then
| catfatAB,t | ∗effAB,t > (effA,t + effB,t)
2
∗ | (catfatA,t + catfatB,t) | (7)
which results in
dif(effAB,t − (effA,t + effB,t)
2
)∗ | catfatAB,t |> 0, (8)
in which both sides of the inequality 7 are calculated at the same point in time when
the hypothetical M&A takes place (i.e. t). Note that liquidity creation can be negative
(for example, the bank destroys liquidity), which the CELCH takes into account. In other
words, the theoretical intuition of CELCH is not affected, even if a consolidated institution
AB destroys liquidity (i.e. the sum of liquidity of institutions A & B is negative) because,
according to the CELCH, this could be mitigated if the consolidation process leads to
cost efficiency gains. We include the absolute value of catfat in inequalities 7 and 8 so
that the latter is always above zero, representing the liquidity creation enhancement that
can occur via cost efficiency enhancement resulting from synergies of prospective M&As
between banks. Hence, we are able to evaluate and compare the liquidity efficiency gains
or losses of potential M&A activity.19
18Because efficiency is computed via the parametric SFA and is expressed as a ratio of the actual
observed level of efficiency to the optimum level of efficiency of the best-practice bank in the sample,
its value ranges from 0 to 1. Consequently, we cannot use the sum (as we did with respect to the
measurement of liquidity of two banks in section 3.1). Instead, we take the weighted average level of
efficiency (as weight we use the size of the bank measured by its total assets) of the involving financial
institutions.
19To create the prospective M&A in both baking sectors, the following econometric steps will be used:
specifically, the weighted sum for the four main variables (Catfat, C, y, and eq) will be computed for
the banks involved in each potential M&A that we examine. With respect to the input prices (w), we
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Furthermore, we conduct a comparative analysis pre-crisis and post-crisis. With re-
spect to the examination of the former period, we use data of the financial institutions
up to 2006. For the investigation of the latter period, we use data subsequent to the
2007 to 2009 financial crisis up to 2011. In this way, we test whether the level of liquidity
associated with efficiency that had been created by the same potential M&As has changed
due to the crisis.
Moreover, we select all the banks that have not been involved in the recent wave of
consolidations among the four systemic banks and create all potential M&As either among
themselves or with one of the four cornerstones of the Greek economy. Additionally, we
control for both single and multiple M&As by one banking institution. Finally, regarding
the four systemic banks, we examine their recent and potential M&As in every possible
combination (i.e. either one-by-one, two-by-two, and so on, or by all the acquired banks
together).20 The purpose of examining these combinations is to test the bank’s liquidity
creation associated with its economic efficiency if it had not been involved in the recent
consolidation process and to focus only on the potential cases of M&As.21
3.2 Stress test scenario
In the second step of our empirical methodology, we examine whether potential bank con-
solidation activity will create the essential dynamics that enhance the liquidity-stability
of the sector in the face of future adverse economic conditions. Our intuition derives from
compute the weighted average of the banks constituting each prospective M&A, while we treat the time
trend (T ) variable as before (i.e. T = .year1, year2..., final-year). We then re-estimate the model as
expressed by equation 2. We select the first operating year in the sample that is common to all involved
institutions as the starting year of each hypothetical consolidation scenario. For example, if bank A and
B’s observations are between 1995 and 2011 and 2001 and 2011, respectively, then the hypothetical bank
AB will be operating between 2001 and 2011. Consequently, the observations for both banks can be
deleted within the overlapping period (i.e., 2001 to 2011). In the end, we re-estimate the cost efficiency
of the new financial institution as it was explicitly described in section 3 and specified by equation 2.
20Regarding recent M&As in the Greek banking sector, we approach each one of these cases as a
potential scenario in the economy, since our sample is dated up to 2011 and the recent consolidation wave
took place in 2012 and 2013. Additionally, to construct the potential M&A combinations, we exclude the
banks with operations that were terminated in the last year of our sample (2011) and those who have
terminated their operations anytime from 2011 to present to ensure that the results are of relative policy
importance.
21We thoroughly acknowledge that each of the following financial institutions for each banking sector
is not a subsidiary of the rest.
From the UK banking sector, we select AIB PLC, Barclays Bank PLC, Royal Bank of Scotland PLC,
HSBC Bank PLC, Lloyds TSB Bank PLC, Standard Chartered Bank PLC, Santander UK PLC, Co-
operative Bank PLC, Sainsbury’s Bank PLC, and UBS PLC. From the Greek banking sector, we choose
National Bank of Greece (or Ethinki Bank), EFG Eurobank, Alpha Bank, Piraeus Bank, Attica Bank,
Panellinia Bank, Pancretan Co-operative Bank, Aegean Bank, Commercial Bank (or Emporiki Bank),
Agricultural Bank (or ATE Bank), Marfin-Egnatia Bank, TT-Hellenic, Genini Bank, Millennium Bank,
Proton Bank, Probank, and FBB Bank. The last nine banks have been already acquired by the four
new systemic’ banks: National Bank of Greece or Ethinki Bank (acquired Probank, FBB Bank) , EFG
Eurobank (acquired TT-Hellenic, Proton Bank), Alpha bank (acquired Emporiki Bank ), Piraeus Bank
(acquired ATE Bank, Marfin-Egnatia Bank, Genini Bank, and Millenium Bank).
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the tremendous impact the recent financial meltdown has had on the stability of financial
intermediaries. To investigate the robustness of liquidity creation in banking sectors we
develop a stress environment that will consist of the potential liquidity shortage faced
by the banks due to adverse macroeconomic, financial, and bank-specific conditions. In
other words, we stress each country’s banking system in three different ways: using a
macroeconomic shock, a financial shock, and a bank shock. The real growth rate of
gross domestic product (GDP) is used for each country to account for macroeconomic
conditions, in line with Rossi and Sekhposyan (2015) who characterise GDP as the most
important macroeconomic factor. The policy interest rates described by the three-month
treasury bill rate and the real effective exchange rate are used to account for financial
distress, and the total problem loans in each banking sector is used to capture the banks’
liquidity risk. These specific variables directly affect the liquidity of banks (Freixas and
Rochet 2008). The efficiency of the banking system has been one of the major issues in
the new monetary and financial environment as it is the dominant segment of a country’s
financial system. In addition, it is generally accepted that efficient bank operation, which
is linked to financial stability, allows enterprisers and households to enjoy higher-quality
services at lower costs. With this in mind and given that banking theory considers a high
level of efficiency as the preponderant precondition against a bank’s default,22 we account
for an additional bank-specific shock: the cost efficiency score of each potential M&A and
of each financial institution in each country that we used in the previous subsection. This
additional bank-specific shock will allow us to examine how its deviation affects liquidity
creation. The choice of variables is in line to Rauch et al. (2010) where they document
the determinants of bank liquidity creation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
study in the literature that addresses the impact of efficiency on liquidity creation and
the direction of causality among those two variables.
To examine the resilience of banking to a variety of different shocks, we follow an econo-
metric procedure that is based upon a vector autoregressive (VAR) model and enables us
to implement a stress test in banking. The choice of VAR as stress test in the banking
sector is not the first time used in the literature. It has been employed by Hoggarth et al.
(2005), to impose a stress test in the UK banking sector, by Dovern et al. (2008) in the
German banking sector, by Koutsomanoli-Filippaki and Mamatzakis (2009) to the Euro-
pean banking sector among others. A vast body of literature (Hoggarth, Sorensen, and
Zicchino, 2005; Marcucci and Quagliariello, 2005; Filosa, 2007) indicates that changes in
the macroeconomic conditions of any economy impacts bank performance, simultaneously
or with a lag. Feedback effects of bank instability on economic activity could amplify the
fluctuations, especially during recessions. The VAR model allows us to fully capture and
22Low levels of efficiency could lead banks to try to boost their performance via laxer credit standards
and/or less intensive monitoring of credit that may weaken their stability (Fiordelisi et al. 2011).
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treat the interaction among macroeconomic and financial variables as endogenous. It also
captures the entailed feedback effect. We use a panel-data vector autoregression (PVAR
) methodology (Holtz - Eakin et al. 1988). This technique combines the traditional VAR
approach, which treats all the variables in the system as endogenous, with the panel-
data approach, which allows for unobserved individual heterogeneity (Love and Zicchino,
2006).
Zit+p = Γi +
q∑
j=1
ΦjZit+p−j + εit+p (9)
where, i = 1, 2, 3..I represents each panel (i.e. each different bank), Γi is a constant
vector, Φj are matrices, εit+p is a vector of residuals/shocks, and p denotes the forecasting
time horizon. Zit+p−j is a vector of residuals/shocks, and p denotes the forecasting time
horizon. Z {it+p-j} is the vector of endogenous variables, including the real growth
rate of GDP, the policy interest rates, the real effective exchange rate, the three-month
treasury bill rate, the level of bad loans, the cost efficiency estimates, and the level of
liquidity creation calculated by the preferred measure “catfat”. We are mainly interested
in examining the behavior of the liquidity creation and of the cost efficiency variable.
The equation in the model for the preferred measure of liquidity creation and, thus, the
equation defining the shock to the preferred measure of liquidity is of the following form:
lcit+p = γlc,i + φlcZit+p−1 + εlc,it+p (10)
where lcit+p represents the liquidity creation measure(“catfat”), εlc,it+p is a white noise
shock, γlc,i is a constant, φlc is a row vector of parameters corresponding to the row of coef-
ficients in Φp in the equation for liquidity creation. Zit+p−1 is the vector of the variables in
the VAR, including liquidity creation itself. The last equation describes the determinants
of the bank liquidity creation, which are lagged values of the variables included in the
VAR. Modelling the dynamics of macroeconomic, financial, bank-specific, and liquidity
creation variables using a VAR is advantageous because impulse response analysis can be
carried out, the stress test proposed in this paper. By estimating the system, it is possible
to simulate various shocks to these variables and consider the feedback from these shocks
to the level of liquidity created by a bank, as well as the aggregate level of a country’s
liquidity needs. One can also investigate whether shocks to the liquidity of the banks
have an impact on future macroeconomic, financial, and bank developments.
Accordingly, the equation in the model for the economic efficiency and thus the equa-
tion defining the shock to the cost efficiency scores is of the following form:
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ceffit+p = γceff,i + φlcZit+p−1 + εceff,it+p (11)
where the left hand-side variable; ceffit+p, represents bank-specific cost efficiency
estimates.
An appealing fact of the VAR modelling is that it does not require the imposition
of strong structural relationships, although theory is involved to select the appropriate
normalization and to interpret the results. Another advantage is that only a minimal
set of assumptions is necessary to interpret the impact of shocks on each variable of the
PVAR system. The reduced form VAR, once the unknown parameters are estimated,
enables dynamic simulations to be implemented. However, this method only allows for
analysis of short-run adjustment effects and not of structural long-run effects. The results
come in the form of impulse response functions (IRFs) and their coefficients analysis, as
well as forecast error variance decompositions (FEVDs) that let one examine the impact
of innovations or shocks to any particular variable on other variables in the system. IRFs
model the dynamics of the response; the coefficients represent the average effects of IRFs
and permit recognition of the significance of the overall response. Variance decompositions
give information about the variation in one variable due to shocks to the others. The
response corresponds to a one-time shock in other variables, holding all the other shocks
constant at zero. In other words, orthogonalizing the response allows us to identify the
effect of one shock at a time, while holding other shocks constant.23
When applying the VAR procedure to panel data, it is important to ensure that the
underlying structure is the same for each cross-sectional unit. Since this constraint is
likely to be violated in practice, one way to overcome the restriction on parameters is
23Since the variance-covariance matrix of the VAR residuals/shocks is unlikely to be diagonal, the
residuals need to be orthogonalised to obtain orthogonalized impulse response functions. Consequently, we
decompose the residuals in a way that makes them orthogonal. Such exercises require careful application
of a VAR identification procedure. The most common way to deal with this problem is to choose a
causal ordering. A standard procedure in the literature is to apply a Cholesky decomposition, which is
equivalent to adopting a particular ordering of the variables and allocating any correlation between the
residuals of any two elements to the variable that is ordered first. These impulse response functions can
be sensitive to the ordering of the variables. In turn, the variables in the model were initially ordered in
ascendance according to the likely speed of reaction to any particular shock. Variables at the front end of
the VAR are assumed to affect the following variables contemporaneously but are only affected by shocks
to the other variables after a lag. Variables at the bottom of the VAR only affect the preceding variables
after a lag but are affected themselves immediately. The financial variables (three-month treasury bill
rate and the real effective exchange rate), were ordered at the bottom of the VAR, implying that they
react instantaneously to shocks in the real side variables. The remaining variables (the growth rate of
gross domestic product, the level of total problem loans, the estimated cost efficiency, and the level of
liquidity creation), react only after a lag following shocks to the financial variables. The growth rate of
GDP was ordered after the level of total problem loans and economic efficiency respectively, reflecting
priors that the economic cycle affects bank losses. The liquidity creation variable was ordered last. Note
that the ordering would be irrelevant if there are low estimated covariances between the errors across
equations. Results show that these covariances are low.
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to allow for individual heterogeneity24 in the levels of the variables by introducing fixed
effects, (Love and Zicchino, 2006). Hence, equation 9 becomes
Zit+p = Γi +
q∑
j=1
ΦjZit+p−j + di + εit+p, (12)
where di denotes the fixed effects.
Since the fixed effects are correlated with the regressors due to lags of the dependent
variables, the mean-differencing procedure commonly used to eliminate fixed effects would
create biased coefficients. To avoid this problem, we use forward mean differencing, also
referred to as the Helmert procedure (Arellano and Bover 1995). This procedure removes
only the forward mean (i.e. the mean of all the future observations available for each
bank-year). This transformation preserves the orthogonality between transformed vari-
ables and lagged regressors, so we can use lagged regressors as instruments and estimate
the coefficients by system GMM . Further, to analyze the impulse response functions,
an estimate of their confidence intervals is needed. Since the matrix of impulse-response
functions is constructed from the estimated VAR coefficients, their standard errors need
to be taken into account. We calculate standard errors of the impulse response func-
tions and generate confidence intervals with 1000 Monte Carlo simulations.25 Finally,
we present variance decompositions, which show the percentage of the variation in one
variable that is explained by the shock to another variable, accumulated over time. The
variance decompositions show the magnitude of the total effect. We report the total effect
accumulated over 10, 20, and 30 periods ahead.
Therefore, stability is compared to the liquidity of the whole banking system for each
hypothetical M&A scenario against a baseline case in which there has been no consol-
idation activity within the sector. Regarding the Greek banking sector, we create an
additional baseline case, which incorporates all the recent consolidation activity in the
country though some specific M&A formations were found to enhance cost efficiency-
liquidity creation.26 In this way, we can accurately compare the two benchmark banking
statuses and extract important inferences from a policy perspective.
24In this study, the nature of individual heterogeneity is based on different business models (i.e. com-
mercial banks, cooperative banks) employed by banks in both banking sectors.
25 In practice, we randomly generate a draw of coefficients of model (1) using the estimated coefficients
and their variance covariance matrix. Then, we re-calculate the impulse-responses. We repeat this
procedure 1000 times (we experimented with a larger number of repetitions and obtained similar results).
We generate 5th and 95th percentiles of this distribution that we use as a confidence interval for the
impulse-responses.
26This baseline scenario will include only the final formation of the four systemic banks, after their
series of consolidation activity and the potential M&A category.
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3.2.1 ‘Half-Life’ Methodology
To conduct precise evaluations and comparisons among these baseline cases and the vari-
ous combinations of potential M&As, we use the concept of ‘half-life’ because it represents
a measure for assessing the speed of mean reversion or persistence in the variable of in-
terest. Specifically, we employ the recently proposed ‘half-life’ measures proposed by
Chortareas and Kapetanios (2013),27 and we calculate the ‘half-life’ of the response of
liquidity creation to each specific shock for each specific potential M&A using the following
equation: ∫ h∗
o
| φ(s) | ds =
∫ ∞
h∗
| φ(s) | ds (13)
where we define the impulse response as a function of s, which we denote as φ(s)
to provide a distinction from standard impulse responses; ds is the order of integration.
Then, h∗ (i.e. ‘half-life’ ) is the point in time at which half the absolute cumulative effect
of the shock has dissipated. It is noteworthy to mention that the methodology that we
propose in this study (i.e. the PVAR model associated with the half-life measures) can be
used to evaluate and compare the performance of firms and individuals in every industry
(e.g., energy, labor, food) and extract important policy implications for regulators.
4 Data
The data consists of an unbalanced panel of all the financial institutions that provided
credit28 from 1988 to 2011 in the UK and from 1993 to 2011 in Greece.29 Following the
majority of empirical studies in banking, we obtain the largest part of our annual bank-
level data from the Bankscope database. Any missing information is supplemented with
information from the official websites of UK and Greek financial institutions, as well as
by the British Bankers and Building Societies Association, the Hellenic Bank Association,
and by the annual reports of both the governors of the Bank of England and the Bank of
Greece. We obtain detailed information on M&As from the Zephyr database.30 Overall,
both our samples account for a significant market share in terms of assets, loans, and
27For a recent summary see also Choi, Mark, and Sul (2006).
28Our sample consists of commercial banks, real estate and mortgage banks, bank holding companies,
cooperative banks, and savings banks.
29The year 1993 has been selected as the starting year for the sample of the Greek banking sector
because full liberalization of the Greek banking system occurred in that year. This followed the provision
of the Second Banking Directive outlining establishment, supervision, and operation in 1992 by the Basic
Banking Law Banking Directive.
30We highlight crucial points of our data selection strategy that have been omitted by the bulk of
empirical studies that have used Bankscope database (Claessens and van Horen 2012; Clerides et al
2013). This strategy is essential to ensuring the accuracy of results and inferences. First, both samples
are checked for double-counted observations. Bankscope provides company account statements for banks
and financial institutions worldwide, by collecting financial statements with both consolidated and uncon-
solidated statuses. Only the unconsolidated data are selected avoid double counting the same financial
institution (in cases where unconsolidated data are not available, consolidated data were used).
21
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
deposits, which occasionally amount to more than 90% in each respective category in
both countries. The UK sample comprises 2,324 observations for 162 financial institu-
tions, whereas the Greek sample consists of 30 financial institutions with a total of 356
observations. The main difference between the two banking sectors is that commercial
banks incorporated in Greece are the dominant group in the banking system. The number
of branches and employees also confirms the dominance of commercial banking. Greek
commercial banks have 3,302 branches in operation (out of 3,575 for all credit institu-
tions, which is equivalent to 92.36%), while the number of employees is 51,012 (out of
56,611 employed in all credit institutions, equivalent to 90.11%), according to the Hellenic
Banking Association (2011).
All data are deflated using each country’s GDP deflator (with 2005 as the base year)
obtained from the World Bank database and converted to US dollars. In addition to the
two considerations in our data filtering process explained in the appendix, we exclude
observations of missing, negative, or zero values for inputs/outputs and control variables.
Our final samples consist of 124 financial institutions and 1834 observations for the UK
banking sector, and 30 financial institutions and 356 observations for the Greek banking
sector. In tables 2.a and 2.b , we provide an overview of characteristic banking indicators
of the UK and Greek banking sector for each year of our study.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Recent & Prospective M&As - “Cost Efficiency-Liquidity
Creation Hypothesis” (CELCH)
In tables 3.a and 3.b, we present a summary of the results31 of all potential and re-
cent/potential M&A activity for the UK and Greece, respectively.32 One of the most sig-
nificant findings is that, in both banking sectors, the majority of potential combinations of
Additionally, M&As were taken into consideration, by thoroughly checking all M&A activities that
took place within both banking sectors to ensure only the merged entity or the acquiring bank remained
in the sample after take-over. For example, assuming that bank A and bank B merged in 2003 to create
a new entity, bank C, then the two individual banks A and B are each included in the dataset until 2003.
From 2003 onwards, these two banks’ operations are considered to be terminated and the new bank (bank
C) is included in the database. In the same spirit, assume that bank A was acquired by bank B in 2003;
both banks are included in the database until 2003, with bank A then becoming inactive after 2003 and
bank B remaining active after 2003.
31Due to space constraints, a detailed illustration of all potential and recent/potential cases of consol-
idation activity considered is available upon request.
32In the UK banking sector, all the M&As cases we demonstrate in table 3.a are artificially created
and labelled as ‘Potential ’. With respect to the Greek banking system and its consolidation activities
presented in table 3.b, we have established three categories. Specifically, we label as ‘Recent M &As’
those M&As that actually have taken place during the recent wave of consolidation. Nevertheless, as it is
aforementioned, we approach each one of those as a potential M&A in the economy, since our sample is
dated up to 2011, and the recent wave of consolidation took place in 2012 and 2013. . The remaining two
categories of M&As in table 3.b, entitled ‘Could Exist (if recent M &As were different)’ and ‘Potential’,
consist of consolidation activities that are artificially created as in the case of the UK banking sector.
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M&A would have contributed considerably to the enhancement of the liquidity-efficiency
relationship had they occurred in the pre-crisis period. Precisely, the empirical evidence
reveals that in more than 99.4% and 98.1% of the UK and Greek (pre-crisis) hypothetical
M&As, cost efficiency and liquidity creation would increase, respectively. In the post-
crisis period, the results highlight a crucial difference between the two countries. In the
UK banking sector, we report a small decrease compared to the pre-crisis period, however,
the difference is much higher in the Greek banking sector between the two periods, where
only 43% of the total hypothetical post-crisis scenarios (as opposed to 87% in the UK)
could have possibly created additional credit channels in the economy with enhanced cost
efficiency. Nevertheless, is important to examine whether the bank size does in any way
affect these results. Small and medium banks can matter for stress scenarios or systemic
risk issues just as much as the big ones. This is true when we think about it from the
perspective of a “too many to fail” crisis as opposed to a “too big to fail” crisis (Acharya
and Yorulmazer, 2007).33 With this in mind, we consider banks’ M&As not only among
large institutions, but among large and medium/small size institutions as well and among
medium/small size institutions only. Overall, in both banking systems for both periods,
hypothetical consolidation activity among large financial institutions creates the greatest
cost efficiency benefits. This could result in increased provision of liquidity to the econ-
omy, which is in line with the findings presented on one hand by Berger and Bouwman
(2009) and Pana et al. (2010), who show a positive relationship between size and liquidity
creation in the US banking sector and on the other hand with Joh and Kim (2013) who
demonstrate that large and well capitalised banks as well as more concentrated banking
sectors seem to have the highest levels of liquidity creation. The size effect that we find
could be explained by the fact that large-sized banks have the infrastructure and ability
to manage their inputs, taking advantage of scale economies as well. Small banks achieve
relatively good performance due to specialization and better control of their inputs as a
result of size. For both the UK and the Greek banking systems in the pre-crisis period,
the same hypothetical M&A combinations produce higher efficiency gains respectively
compared to the years following the crisis. This illustrates the detrimental impact that
The reason we examine the category entitled ‘Recent M &As’, is to test whether the selection by the
authorities of those specific institutions to be involved in the recent wave of consolidation activity, could
indeed create cost efficiency synergies and liquidity creation enhancement that could lead to economic
growth.
Nevertheless, we also wanted to investigate every possible combination of M&A among all the banks
in the Greek banking sector in the hope that some of them could be beneficial for the economic growth
of the country. As a result we construct the aforementioned cases where we label them ‘Could Exist (if
recent M &As were different)’ and ‘Potential’ combinations. Thus, in this way, we are confident that we
present all the spectrum of consolidation activity, i.e., both actual and non-actual M&As that could be
proven vital for the amelioration and stability of the Greek banking sector.
33We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this point.
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the recent financial turmoil had on both banking system stability in both countries.
In the UK banking sector, for most of the cases that contribute successfully to the
cost efficiency-liquidity relationship, the combinations that consist of three banking in-
stitutions produce higher positive differences compared to those consisting of two credit
institutions. Precisely, it seems that the big-four of the UK banking sector (Barclays,
HSBC, Lloyds, and RBS) create the most cost-efficient combinations of potential M&A
activity, which could result in increased liquidity creation, with Barclays producing the
highest during the pre-crisis period and Lloyds producing the highest during the post-
crisis period. On the contrary, potential M&As among small banks do not improve their
cost efficiency and liquidity creation. This is consistent with Hughes and Mester (2013),
who provide empirical evidence of higher level of scale economies for large USA banks
compared to their small counterparts. Thus, increased size and increased market share
deriving from potential M&A activity is essential in the exploitation of economies of scale,
which will enhance cost efficiency and produce increased liquidity creation.
Regarding the Greek banking sector, empirical evidence reveals a positive relationship
between size and the CELCH for the pre-crisis period, as in the UK banking sector. The
big four of the Greek banking sector (National bank of Greece, EFG Eurobank, Alpha
Bank, and Piraeus Bank), produce the highest cost efficiency-liquidity creation gains,
with the National Bank of Greece first in this list. This holds when we examine them
in their previous individual formation and in the current systemic shape resulting from
the recent consolidation process. Nonetheless, the results for the post-crisis period are
mixed. To be more precise, we report strong evidence of decreased cost efficiency-liquidity
creation produced by potential M&A combinations for all four new systemic cornerstones
of the Greek economy. On the contrary, our empirical examination indicates that the
big four in their pre-systemic shape or during their systemic formation (i.e. if they had
not acquired specific financial institutions), would produce higher cost efficiency-liquidity
levels. Unavoidably, these points cast doubts on the selection process followed by the
Greek government and other financial institutions (such as the EFSF, the HFSF, and
executive boards involved in recent consolidations in Greece) in deciding which financial
institution will be the acquirer and which the target.
For both banking systems and for both periods, we observe strong empirical evidence of
prospective consolidation activities among specific banking institutions that could ame-
liorate economic activity and growth via the efficiency and liquidity headway the new
banks experience.34
34We have performed a series of robustness checks for both banking systems by using alternative
liquidity indicators that have been vastly used by bank managers and practitioners in supranational
institutions. The empirical evidence reveals no statistical significant difference. The results are available
upon request.
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5.2 Stress test scenario
In this subsection, the empirical analysis has a twofold scope: on the one hand, we
investigate the contribution of the successful potential combinations of M&As of UK and
Greek banks in the post-crisis period to the robustness of banking system in terms of
liquidity risk using PVAR methodology. In this context, success is defined in terms of
cost efficiency-liquidity creation gains. At the same time, we examine the impact of bank
cost efficiency on liquidity creation and the direction of their causality. This, in essence,
econometrically tests the empirical foundations of our suggested “cost efficiency - liquidity
creation” hypothesis.
Before proceeding with the PVAR approach, an essential condition is that all variables
included in the system are stationary. With respect to this, we run the model in first
differences to focus on the dynamics of liquidity creation adjustments and short run
effects.35 Additionally, we test whether the main variables of interest are stationary by
examining two different panel unit root tests: the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF)
and the Phillips-Perron (PP) type Fisher Chi-square tests of Maddala and Wu (1999).36
All unit root tests are reported in tables 4.a and 4.b for the UK and Greece, respectively.37
The results strongly suggest that all the variables included in the analysis do not follow
a unit root process in each potential M&A scenario for both banking systems.
Another important issue before we proceed with the estimation of the PVAR is to
determine the appropriate lag order, p, of the right-hand variables in the system of
equations. Lu¨tkepohl (2005) suggests that models with different lag orders should be
estimated. Then, the model with the highest lag order that passes the diagnostic tests
should be chosen. To do so, we utilize the Arellano-Bover GMM estimator for higher
order of lags. We use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to choose the optimal lag
length. The AIC suggests that the optimum lag length is one; the Arellano-Bond AR
tests confirm this. We included more lags to control for autocorrelation. Moreover, the
Sargan tests provide evidence of lag order one, as well.
35Another way to proceed would be to test for stationarity variables in levels and, if they are found
non-stationary, to test for cointegration between variables. The absence of a cointegration relationship
would justify focusing on short-run and using variables in first differences. The presence of cointegration
would call for structural VAR analysis of long-run effects. Our study does not address long-run effects
and, therefore, we directly use variables in first differences.
36Because we have unbalanced data, we can conduct either the unit root test of Im-Pesaran-Shin
(IPS) (2003) or the Fisher-type unit-root tests. Nevertheless, the IPS unit-root test requires at least
10 observations per panel, which is not the case in our study. Additionally, Maddala and Wu (1999)
favor Fisher-type unit-root tests as they are more powerful in distinguishing the null and the alternative
hypotheses and cross-sectional correlation among variables.
37We test for a unit root in each potential M&A scenario for both countries. However for brevity
purposes, we report only the two common in both countries baseline cases where no bank consolidation
activity has been held in the sector.
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5.2.1 Impulse response functions
Figure 2 illustrates the IRFs with respect to liquidity creation deriving from the PVAR
system for both the UK and Greek baseline scenario consisting of no bank consolidation
activity in the sector and the additional baseline scenario including the recent wave of
Greek banks’ for each of our shocks. Looking at figure 2, financial and bank shocks have
the most persistent effect on liquidity creation. As far as the financial shock is concerned,
in all three rows a one standard deviation shock of the three month treasury bill rate
on liquidity is positive and statistically significant, while the effect of the real effective
exchange rate is innocuous.
Comparing the two countries’ banking sectors, the effect of a change in the level of
policy rates on liquidity is more persistent in the Greek banking sector, in which it takes
about two years to lose significance, while it requires approximately one and a half years
in the UK banking sector. Looking at the two Greek baseline scenarios,38 is noteworthy
the fact that its effect is slightly greater in the systemic formation of the banking sector.
As far the bank shock is concerned, we highlight that both its sources (the cost efficiency
and total problem loans variables) generate a positive and statistical significant impact on
liquidity creation.39 As far as the shock on the non-performing loans variable is concerned,
it is always statistically significant and more persistent in the Greek banking sector with
a statistically significant time-period difference of about half a year more than the UK.
Additionally, the impact is more pronounced after the recent M&As in the Greek banking
system.
That a positive one standard deviation shock of cost efficiency (i.e. bank-specific
shock) on liquidity creation variable triggers a positive and statistically significant re-
sponse in both countries,40 is of major importance for two reasons: For the first time in
the literature, we provide empirical insight on the impact of efficiency on liquidity cre-
ation and its sign. Second, that the response of liquidity is positive provides empirical
proof of the positive impact cost efficiency has on liquidity creation, which is in line with
38The two baseline scenarios (or formations) in the Greek banking sector refer to the Greek banking
system before and after the recent wave of consolidation activity that led to the creation of the four
systemic banks (i.e. the big-four banks of the sector after a series of specific M&As that each of the four
realized).
39The fact that the liquidity creation variable (i.e. catfat) has a positive response in the same direction
in both sources of the bank shock variables (i.e. cost efficiency and total problem loans), confirms that
there is no violation from a theoretical perspective. In other words, it is theoretically correct to construct
our bank-specific shock using the average of both cost efficiency (ceff) and total problem loans (TPL)
variables, since the IRFs in figure 2 illustrate that the response of the liquidity creation variable on each
proceeds the same direction. In the scenario where the response of catfat was not in the same direction
for both bank specific variables (i.e ceff and TPL), we would not be able to use the average of ceff and
TPL to create a common bank-specific shock. This is because the two different, in direction, responses
could potentially cancel out the individual effect of each bank specific variable on liquidity creation.
40This positive response of liquidity creation to the cost efficiency shock becomes more apparent in the
formation that includes the recent consolidation activity in the Greek banking sector.
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the CELCH. Furthermore, we highlight that the cost efficiency bank-specific shock on
liquidity creation takes at least six months less to be absorbed in the UK than in the
Greek banking sector. An interesting finding is that this impact seems to be of minor im-
portance in the Greek banking system without its current systemic nature. This amplifies
our belief that recent M&As between Greek banks did not contribute to the amelioration
of the cost efficiency of proforma banks’ and to the overall sector’s cost efficiency which
could enhance liquidity creation.41 Lastly, we note that in both countries and in both
formations of the Greek banking system, the response of liquidity to a macroeconomic
shock, exhibits a rather oscillating pattern which reflects a downwards movement during
the first periods and an upward direction thereafter, though is not statistical significant.
Figure 3 displays the response of cost efficiency for all three categories of shocks. One
of the most intrinsic differences is that all shocks are persistent on cost efficiency. A
closer look at the bank shocks (i.e. liquidity creation, NPLs) reveals that cost efficiency is
decreasing after innovations to each one of those two. From this, we extract two important
inferences. First, non-performing loans decrease cost efficiency; thus, financial institutions
seek to find strategies to confront this issue. According to the banking theory, a successful
strategy regarding issuing loans is to reduce information asymmetries and improve the
screening process of their borrowers. Thus, we provide additional empirical evidence in
line with the proposed CELCH. Second, despite our previous report that an increase on
liquidity creation is present after a positive shock of cost efficiency, we now highlight a
decrease of cost efficiency when there is a positive bank-specific shock to liquidity. At first
sight, this result might look odd; nevertheless, it is in line with recent studies highlighting
that excess liquidity creation could distort the banking sector’s stability by triggering
bank failures (Fungacova et al. 2013). To put it differently, despite the fact that liquidity
creation is desirable in the economy, because it increases the available credit channels and
enhances investment and growth, beyond the ‘optimum’ level, it increases the likelihood
of distress of a bank. Additionally, the severity of losses is exacerbated as assets are
liquidated to meet liquidity demands (Allen and Gale 2004).
At this point, it would be interesting to pinpoint the direction of causality among
liquidity creation and cost efficiency, which is quite challenging due to the conflicting
direction of the response of each variable to a standard deviation shock of the other. An
important difference between these two shocks is that the innovation of cost efficiency
becomes apparent on liquidity creation after one period, whereas the shock of liquidity
creation has an instantaneous negative impact on cost efficiency. Additionally, we high-
41As a robustness check, different ordering of the variables was considered. The impulse responses were
computed using the generalized impulse function described by Pesaran and Shin (1998). This method
constructs an orthogonal set of shocks that does not depend on the variable ordering. The results remained
unchanged.
27
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
light that the persistence of liquidity creation’s innovation on cost efficiency is twice as
large as the cost efficiency’s shock on liquidity. Considering the last two points, we argue
that the direction of causality between these two variables of interest is stronger from
liquidity creation towards cost efficiency than the reverse. 42
5.2.2 Variance decompositions
To shed more light into our analysis, we also present variance decompositions (VDCs),
which show the percentage of the variation for one variable is explained by the shock
effects within another variable. In tables 5 and 6, the total effect accumulated over 10, 20
and 30 years for all the baselines liquidity creation and cost-efficiency conditions in the
UK and the Greek banking sector are presented.
The empirical evidence in table 5 indicates the importance of the bank shocks and
specifically the aggregate level of NPLs for explaining liquidity creation variations. To be
more precise, approximately 11.6% and 13.6% of liquidity creation’s forecast error variance
over 30 years is explained by the level of NPLs in the UK and Greek banking sectors,
without any potential bank consolidation activity. We highlight that the aforementioned
13.6% percentage increases and reaches 20% in the recent systemic formation of the Greek
banking sector. In contrast, the cost-efficiency variable only explains approximately 4%
of potential deviations between the forecasted and the true values of liquidity creation in
the UK banking sector and 1% in the pre-systemic formation of the Greek banking sector
(see table 6). The previous 1% percentage becomes even smaller after the creation of
the four systemic cornerstones of the Greek economy. Macroeconomic factors play a more
important role in explaining variations to forecasted liquidity creation in the UK compared
to the Greek banking sectors, although they account for less than 2%. Financial indicators
show a common pattern for both countries, specifically in the level of policy interest rates,
which accounts for approximately 4% of the 30-year liquidity creation forecast error in
the banking systems of both countries. The effect of the exchange rate is innocuous.
Table 6 presents the variance decompositions for cost efficiency, and a noteworthy
difference shows that liquidity creation values accounts for a larger percentage of the de-
viation from cost efficiency values, than cost efficiency accounts for the deviation from
liquidity creation’s true values. This holds true for both countries and in all specifications.
This finding is of crucial importance because it proves that the direction of causality from
liquidity creation to cost efficiency is stronger than in the opposite direction. Addition-
ally, both sources for the bank shock explain to a greater extent any deviations between
the forecasted and true values for cost efficiency in the UK banking system, when com-
42As in the case of the response of the liquidity creation variable, the sign of the response of cost
efficiency is the same in each one of the shocked bank variables; this shows that there is no violation from
a theoretical perspective when we characterize the average innovation of both liquidity creation and total
problem loans variables as a bank shock (on cost efficiency).
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pared to the Greek system, with or without the recent wave of consolidations. Regarding
macroeconomic and financial shocks, contributions to future deviations in cost efficiency
scores are more significant in the Greek banking sector than in the UK banking sector,
particularly in its recent systemic formation. This finding increases concerns for a more
sound banking system deriving from the recent consolidation activity among the big-four
Greek banks.
For this reason, the stability of the UK and Greek banking sectors towards their liq-
uidity creation is investigated further (in the next subsection), in both their baseline sce-
narios, against hypothetical macroeconomic, financial and bank unexpected innovations,
by exploring the behaviour of specific potential consolidation activities.
5.2.3 Recent & Prospective M&As - ‘Half-life’ comparisons
Tables 7a and 7b present potential combinations for M&As that create the necessary
dynamics for UK and Greek banking system to exhibit more stable liquidity-creation
levels when exposed to three different types of shocks (i.e. macroeconomic, financial, and
bank shocks). Precisely, tables 7a and 7b present all potential M&A cases that form a
banking sector with lowered half-life and total effect values (after each shock), compared to
a banking sector without consolidation activity or without further consolidation activity
(as is the case with the Greek banking sector). The prospective banking consolidation
activity was compared against one benchmark for the UK’s banking system, and against
two benchmarks (i.e. with and without the recent bank M&A activity) for the Greek
banking system. It is noteworthy that potential consolidation activity among the largest
banks in each country constitutes the most robust banking sectors with respect to their
liquidity creation. This result amplifies previous findings in this study concerning high
levels of liquidity creation, enhanced cost efficiency, and the after-effect economic benefits
that are produced by M&As among large banks. Thus, it appears that more frequent
consolidation activity among large and cost efficient financial institutions leads to greater
stability for liquidity creation. Finally, as far as the Greek banking system is concerned,
the half-life and total effect results indicate that, in all three hypothetical stress tests the
initial structure of the Greek banking sector (which does not incorporate the M&As of
the big four institutions) is more robust. This finding amplifies concerns regarding the
true economic gains stemming from the recent wave of consolidations.
6 Concluding Remarks
This study proposes a novel theoretical hypothesis, named “cost efficiency-liquidity cre-
ation” hypothesis (CELCH), which argues that a bank consolidation activity that gen-
erates cost efficiency gains, can result in both increased liquidity and economic growth
surplus. An additional novelty of this study is that it presents empirical evidence regard-
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ing the direction of causality among these two variables. We approach this framework by
employing recently developed measures of liquidity creation that account for both on and
off balance sheet banks’ activities (Berger and Bouwman 2009). Additionally, whether
potential M&As in the UK and Greek banking system could enhance households and
firms through the creation of additional credit channels in the economy is investigated.
Comparative and forecasting analyses were conducted for the pre-crisis and post-crisis pe-
riods, which have major policy implications regarding the trade-off between shareholders’
personal gains and society’s economic prosperity that can trigger M&A activity.
A novel methodology to evaluate and compare the robustness of M&As is proposed,
using a stress-test scenario and a panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) model, which en-
ables inferences of major policy implications regarding the stability of vulnerable banking
systems related to the recent financial crisis. Thus, the impact of adverse macroeconomic,
financial, and bank-specific conditions were determined, and unbiased inferences regard-
ing the robustness and liquidity creation of Greek and UK banking sectors were made,
with crucial policy implications for economic growth. Additionally, this is the first study
to address empirically the impact of efficiency on liquidity. This is an important aspect,
since efficiency enhancement is an explicit policy objective in the Single Market Directive
of the European Commission, while liquidity is the main driver of recently implemented
regulations to banking supervision under the Basel III Accord. To make more precise
evaluations and comparisons between potential M&A cases, recently proposed ‘half-life’
measures (Chortareas and Kapetanios, 2013) for associated impulse response functions
were used to examine the robustness and determine the total effect on liquidity creation,
of the UK and Greek banks’ hypothetical consolidation activities, resulting from adverse
macroeconomic, financial, and bank-specific developments. The aforementioned novel
methodology can be used to evaluate and compare the performances of firms and individ-
uals in every industry (e.g., energy, labour, food etc.) and allow supervisory authorities
to design the most effective regulatory framework.
Empirical evidence is provided, via the proposed CELCH, for increased liquidity, gen-
erated from the potential M&A activity of two and three banking institutions during the
pre-crisis and post-crisis era, though the evidence during the former period is considerably
stronger. Large financial institutions produce the highest cost efficiency benefits, which
can result in increased liquidity provisions in an economy. This is consistent in both
banking systems and for both crisis periods. The recent wave of bank consolidations and
the creation of the four cornerstones in Greek economy cast doubts on the decisions of
policy makers and bank boards involved in the selection process for economic benefits.
The results indicate decreased cost efficiency-liquidity creation levels and less efficient
channels of credit able to boost economic activity and development.
The stress test scenario reveals the positive impact of cost efficiency on liquidity cre-
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ation and sets a solid foundation for the proposed CELCH of this study. The empirical
evidence shows that more robust conditions exist in the UK banking sector when com-
pared to the Greek banking sector, with respect to liquidity creation, when hypothetical
adverse, macroeconomic, financial, and bank-specific conditions occur within the econ-
omy. In both countries’ banking sectors, bank shocks—specifically the level of NPLs—are
more persistent and account for most deviations in forecasted values for liquidity from its
trues levels. Nonetheless, all three types of shocks are found to play an important role in
the banking sector of both countries and in all baseline cost-efficiency conditions. The re-
sults also highlight that the direction of causality for these two variables is stronger when
moving from liquidity creation to cost efficiency. Lastly, the ‘half-life’ and total effect
results of all three different in nature shocks are more persistent in the current systemic
formation of the Greek banking sector compared to its pre-crisis formation, which raises
further concerns about the social economic gains of the recent wave of bank M&As.
All in all, this study presents important policy implications for the post-crisis era.
Additional credit channels in the economy can be generated through potential bank con-
solidation activity. According to the proposed CELCH, credit facilitation can contribute
to economic growth only if enhanced cost efficiency is apparent in the new financial en-
tity. However, the PVAR methodology for examining the robustness of a banking system
during exogenous and endogenous shocks should be further applied before any police im-
plementation takes place. Specifically, worldwide banking systems, not only in EU and in
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) area but also in emerging economies, should
be empirically investigated as well. It would be interesting to investigate the impact of
profit efficiency on liquidity creation to determine both standards of economic efficiency in
additional countries. In this way, a more complete view of the overall impact of economic
efficiency on liquidity creation can be established.
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Appendix
Figures
Figure 1.a: UK - Growth rate of credit to public & private sector by UK financial intermediaries
Notes: This figure displays the annual growth rate of the volume of loans and credit facility provided in both public and
private sector by the financial intermediaries operating in the UK banking sector.
Figure 1.b: Greece - Growth rate of credit to public & private sector by Greek financial intermediaries
Notes: This figure displays the annual growth rate of the volume of loans and credit facility provided in both public and
private sector by the financial intermediaries operating in the Greek banking sector.
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Figure 2: Liquidity Creation - Impulse Response Functions
UK
Greece BEFORE the recent consolidation activity
Greece AFTER the recent consolidation activity
This figure illustrates the impulse response functions of Liquidity Creation with respect to a Bank, a Macroeconomic and a Financial shock, deriving from the panel vector
autoregressive (PVAR) system for both the UK and Greek baseline scenario where there is no bank consolidation activity in the sector and the additional baseline scenario that
indicates the current conditions of the Greek banking system after the recent wave of Greek banks' M&As. Specifically, 'd Catfat2', 'd TPL',  'd GDP', 'd Real EER' and 'd 3M Tbill'
 refer to the first differences of Liquidity Creation, Total Problem Loans ( i.e. Bank shock), Gdp Growth Rate (i.e. Macroeconomic shock), Real Effective Exchange Rate
(i.e. Financial shock) and Three month treasury bill rate (i.e. Financial shock) respectively, while 'Ceff' refers to the cost efficiency score ( i.e. Bank shock).
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Figure 3: Cost Efficiency - Impulse Response Functions
UK
Greece BEFORE the recent consolidation activity
Greece AFTER the recent consolidation activity
This figure illustrates the impulse response functions of Cost Efficiency with respect to a Bank, a Macroeconomic and a Financial shock, deriving from the panel vector
autoregressive (PVAR) system for both the UK and Greek baseline scenario where there is no bank consolidation activity in the sector and the additional baseline scenario that
indicates the current conditions of the Greek banking system after the recent wave of Greek banks' M&As. Specifically, 'd Catfat2', 'd TPL',  'd GDP', 'd Real EER' and 'd 3M Tbill'
 refer to the first differences of Liquidity Creation, Total Problem Loans ( i.e. Bank shock), Gdp Growth Rate (i.e. Macroeconomic shock), Real Effective Exchange Rate
(i.e. Financial shock) and Three month treasury bill rate (i.e. Financial shock) respectively, while 'Ceff' refers to the cost efficiency score ( i.e. Bank shock).
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Tables
Table 1: Bank activities of liquidity creation measures
Assets
Illiquid assets (weight = 1/2) by Category Semiliquid assets (weight = 0)  by Category Liquid assets (weight = –1/2)
Commercial real estate loans (CRE) Residential real estate loans (RRE) Cash and due from other institutions
Loans to finance agricultural production Consumer loans All securities
Other loans and leases financing Loans to depository institutions Trading assets
Other real estate owned (OREO) Loans to state and local governments Fed funds sold
Customers’ liability on bankers acceptances Loans to foreign governments
Customers’ liability on bankers acceptances
Intangible assets
Premises
Other assets
Illiquid assets (weight = 1/2) by Maturity Semiliquid assets (weight = 0) by Maturity
Loans and leases with a remaining maturity  > 1 year Loans and leases with a remaining maturity <= 1 year
Liabilities plus equity
Liquid liabilities (weight = 1/2) Semiliquid liabilities (weight = 0) Illiquid liabilities plus equity (weight = –1/2)
Transactions deposits Time deposits Bank’s liability on bankers acceptances
Savings deposits Other borrowed money Subordinated debt
Overnight federal funds purchased Overnight federal funds purchased
Trading liabilities Other liabilities
Equity
Off-balance sheet: Financial guarantees
Illiquid guarantees (weight = 1/2) Semiliquid guarantees (weight = 0) Liquid guarantees (weight = –1/2)
Unused commitments Net credit derivatives Net participations acquired
Net standby letters of credit Net securities lent
Commercial and similar letters of credit
All other off-balance sheet liabilities
Off-balance sheet: Derivatives
Liquid derivatives (weight=?1/2 )
Interest rate derivatives
Foreign exchange derivatives
Equity and commodity derivatives
Notes: This table reports definitions of both 'on' and 'off' balance sheet items in terms of their liquidity, which is the basis for calculation of the liquidity creation
measures. The general functional form to calculate liquidity creation, which is the preferred measure 'catfat' of Berger and Bouwman's (2009) as well, is
                        Liquidity Creation (LC) = [ ½ × illiquid assets (cat) + 0 × semi-liquid assets (cat) – ½ × liquid assets (cat) ] +
                                                                  [ ½ × liquid liabilities + 0 × semi-liquid liabilities – ½ × illiquid liabilities – ½ ×  equity capital ] +
                                                                 [ ½ × illiquid guarantees + 0 × semi-liquid guarantees – ½ × liquid guarantees  – ½ × liquid derivatives ]
In line with Berger and Bouwman (2009) methodology:
a. Step 1: We classify all bank activities as liquid, semiliquid, or illiquid. b. Step 2: We assign weights to the activities classified in step 1.
c. Step 3: We combine bank activities as classified in step 1 and as weighted in step 2 in different ways to construct four liquidity creation measures.
d. We classify loans both by category and maturity.
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year Num OBS   T.A (B) Gr. Ls (B) Dep. (B)  Eqt. (B)  L.L.P (M) HHI
1988 13 10.73 18.09 9.58 0.55 25.77 0.19
1989 40 16.6 26.98 14.33 0.86 338.95 0.12
1990 49 19.4 36.34 16.76 0.96 205.41 0.08
1991 53 21.63 37.9 18.64 1.11 287.72 0.08
1992 66 17.16 25.94 14.39 0.87 227.15 0.08
1993 69 15.95 23.62 13.04 0.81 147.54 0.07
1994 70 19.92 31.13 15.9 1.01 76.32 0.08
1995 80 14.56 22.57 11.56 0.89 45.88 0.06
1996 110 14.76 25.06 11.75 0.92 30.11 0.05
1997 114 18.04 29.84 14.22 0.99 38.9 0.08
1998 115 20.52 34.13 16.16 1.16 100.34 0.06
1999 116 18.3 29.59 14.47 1.2 73.44 0.05
2000 117 24.06 35.9 18.94 1.7 67.05 0.07
2001 120 23.65 34.3 18.73 1.77 95.16 0.06
2002 125 33.11 53.37 26.58 2.05 127.42 0.07
2003 127 35.3 63.01 27.02 2.76 137.02 0.06
2004 127 73.56 142.07 59.93 5.16 351.77 0.15
2005 126 87.6 150.83 62.92 4.42 223.69 0.12
2006 121 104.11 204.36 68.12 6.32 541.66 0.14
2007 120 132.24 264.95 98.8 8.22 579.07 0.23
2008 116 107.92 157.32 53.52 4.1 783.78 0.09
2009 116 87.82 142.22 53.25 7.16 971.87 0.08
2010 113 86.56 135.5 51.52 7.32 675.16 0.07
2011 101 138.39 213.96 80.69 10.43 863.94 0.08
Total 2324 1141.89 1938.98 790.82 72.74 7015.12 0.09
Notes: This table presents an overview of the UK banking system throughout our sample
period.  T.A, Gr. Ls, Dep., Eqt, L.L.P, HHI represent  average values of Total Assets, Gross
loans, Deposits,  Equity, Loans and loss Provisions and Market Concentration  (expressed
by the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) Index and it is defined as the sum of the squares of the
market shares of all banks in the sample for each year:  a HHI index below 0.01 indicates
a highly competitive index, a HHI index below 0.15 indicates an unconcentrated index, a
HHI index between 0.15 to 0.25 indicates moderate concentration, while a HHI index above
0.25 indicates high concentration.) respectively. 'B' stands for billions while 'M' for millions.
Table 2.a: UK - Time Series Analysis of characteristic banking indicators
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year Num OBS   T.A (B) Gr. Ls (B) Dep. (B)  Eqt. (B)  L.L.P (M) HHI
1993 19 3.84 5.24 3.28 0.17 12.91 0.21
1994 19 4.85 6.89 4.18 0.22 18.54 0.23
1995 19 6.05 8.7 5.25 0.26 13.78 0.21
1996 21 5.04 6.95 4.49 0.24 24.62 0.16
1997 21 5.74 6.92 5.07 0.27 32.97 0.2
1998 20 6.79 8.19 6.06 0.42 41.5 0.16
1999 16 8.77 9.1 7.47 0.9 45.36 0.16
2000 15 9.31 8.77 8.04 0.83 38.31 0.16
2001 15 9.94 8.76 8.77 0.76 44.99 0.17
2002 18 9.85 10.33 8.76 0.6 47.85 0.18
2003 20 11.84 14.96 10.17 0.81 75.79 0.16
2004 21 13.33 18.15 10.83 0.79 89.34 0.15
2005 21 13.44 15.86 10.93 0.93 75.35 0.14
2006 19 19.2 25.29 15.08 1.39 125.15 0.14
2007 19 26.95 39.68 19.55 2.27 120.8 0.13
2008 19 31.71 44.12 25.05 2.13 260.27 0.14
2009 19 34.67 49.95 28.1 2.85 424.91 0.14
2010 20 30.36 40.57 24.77 2.74 562.62 0.13
2011 15 30.54 39.51 26.21 1.1 1779.96 0.19
Total 356 282.22 367.94 232.06 19.68 3835.02 0.17
Notes: This table presents an overview of the Greek banking system throughout our sample
period.  T.A, Gr. Ls, Dep., Eqt, L.L.P, HHI represent  average values of Total Assets, Gross
loans, Deposits,  Equity, Loans and loss Provisions and Market Concentration  (expressed
by the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) Index and it is defined as the sum of the squares of the
market shares of all banks in the sample for each year:  a HHI index below 0.01 indicates
a highly competitive index, a HHI index below 0.15 indicates an unconcentrated index, a
HHI index between 0.15 to 0.25 indicates moderate concentration, while a HHI index above
0.25 indicates high concentration.) respectively. 'B' stands for billions while 'M' for millions.
Table 2.b: Greece - Time Series Analysis of characteristic banking indicators
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Tables 3.a: UK - Prospective M&As scenarios
Difference of Cost Efficiency/Liquidity Creation (M)
 Up to 2006 Up to 2011
Financial Institution Min Max Min Max
Co-operative Bank Plc (The) -388.955 10755.7 -2897.36 6066.36
UBS -388.955 4463.95 -2897.36 2298.03
Sainsbury's Bank plc 66.1156 5395.02 -2228.15 7226.36
AIB 223.02 6442.57 -1881.29 3910.95
Lloyds TSB Bank Plc 275.4 14487 -1736.16 4752.82
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 335.595 13889.6 -1697.53 2939.58
Santander UK Plc 398.14 6589.49 -1665.48 4724.22
HSBC Bank plc 415.052 14487 -1204.2 8947.36
Standard Chartered Bank 449.905 7926.39 -972.787 8947.36
Barclays Bank Plc 535.716 14487 -525.764 3897.12
This table presents for each financial institution that has been considered in the UK banking sector, the range of values that it can
generate from all its prospective M&A scenario, of the difference in the estimated level of cost efficiency associated with the level
of liquidity creation 'between the potentially 'consolidated' institution and of the 'proforma' institution  both in 2006
(i.e. pre crisis scenario) and in 2011 (i.e. post crisis scenario). 'M' stands for millions. The level of of liquidity creation is
computed by the model described in table 1, whereas the level of cost efficiency is estimated by the following model:
                                                                                        lnTC,it=lnC(y{it},w{it},T,E{it} ;β)+u{it}+v{it}
where subscripts i=1,....N  stand for each financial institution (i.e. each M&A activity), T=.year1,year2...,final-year, and indicates
a time trend and is included in each specification to  allow for technological change, using both linear and quadratic terms (i.e. T
and T²) respectively. TC_{it} is individual bank total cost; y_{it} and w_{it} indicate vectors of output and input prices; we specify
 equity (E) as a quasi-fixed input to control for differences in risk preferences, which may arise due to regulation, financial
distress, or informational asymmetries; β is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The two-sided random error term v_{it}
 is assumed to be independent of the non-negative cost efficiency variable u_{it} and is assumed to follow a symmetric normal
 distribution around the frontier and ui, accounts for the firm's inefficiency and is assumed to follow a half-normal distribution.
Detailed results of each prospective M&A scenario in the UK banking sector are available upon request.
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Tables 3.b: Greece - Recent & Prospective M&As scenarios
Difference of Cost Efficiency/Liquidity Creation (M)
Up to 2006 Up to 2011
Recent M&As - Systemic formation
ALPHA-EMPORIKI 4536.91 1395.63
ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK 7648.84 4070.01
PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM 445.36 -617.14
EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC 4086.79 -473.38
Up to 2006 Up to 2011
Could Exist (if Recent M&As were different) Min Max Min Max
ALPHA 1525.16 3734.16 1084.44 1878.05
ETHNIKI 3950.47 7991.02 2907.92 4394.21
PIRAEUS 1636.99 3420.91 1448.64 2463.36
EUROBANK 1369.44 3215.15 1019.9 1720.31
EMPORIKI 1698.48 3602.54 1435.35 2738.82
FBB 624.24 1817.14 389.4 923.72
PROBANK 694.97 1995.33 470.61 1080.36
ATE 1597.67 3375.16 1400.86 2625.52
GENIKI 1129.94 2635.34 912.32 1838.86
MARFIN_EGNATIA 1532.12 3092.19 1334.39 2246.97
MILLENIUM 921.56 2371.75 645.2 1466.98
PROTON 777.57 2182.81 550.23 1288.17
TT-HELLENIC 1297.72 2869.94 1102.94 2153.13
PANELLINIA 1369.44 3950.47 1019.9 2950.33
AEGEAN 1528.02 4133.74 1665.81 4394.21
PANCRETAN 1904.32 4796.59 1525.53 4097.23
ATTICA 3215.15 7991.02 1448.64 2907.92
Up to 2006 Up to 2011
Potential Min Max Min Max
ALPHA-EMPORIKI 1310.17 1310.17 -2740.43 2706.03
ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK 1876.07 10080.73 -3399.33 2793.67
PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM -150.75 388.77 -7154.69 471.41
EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC 284.18 5828.47 -1480.27 848.77
PANELLINIA -150.75 6079.13 -7154.69 1894.45
AEGEAN -22.1 7776.37 -2740.43 2793.67
PANCRETAN -22.1 8238.43 -7154.69 2706.03
ATTICA -22.1 10080.73 -3399.33 -72.51
Notes: This tables presents for each recent and prospective M&A scenario in the Greek banking sector, the difference in the estimated level of cost
efficiency  'associated with the level of 'liquidity 'creation 'between the potentially ''consolidated' institution and of the 'proforma' institution both in 2006
(i.e. pre crisis scenario) and in 2011 (i.e. post crisis scenario). We label 'as `Recent M&As - Systemic formation' those M&As that did actually take place
during ' the recent wave of consolidation and resulted to the creation of the four systemic financial institutions. Nevertheless, we approach each one of
those as a potential M&A scenario in the 'economy, since our sample is dated up to 2011 and the recent wave of consolidation took place in 2012 and 2013.
The remaining two categories of M&As in table 3b, entitled `Could Exist (if recent M&As were different)' and `Potential' consist of consolidation activities
that are artificially created. For the two aforementioned categories we present the range of values that each financial institution can 'generate from all its
prospective M&A scenario. 'M' stands for millions. The level of liquidity creation is computed by the model described in table 1, whereas the level of cost
efficiency is estimated by the following model:
                                                                                                                      lnTC,it=lnC(y{it},w{it},T,E{it} ;β)+u{it}+v{it}
where subscripts i=1,....N  stand for each financial institution (i.e. each M&A activity), T=.year1,year2...,final-year, and indicates a time trend and is
included in each specification to allow for technological change, using both linear and quadratic terms (i.e. T and T²) respectively. TC_{it} is individual
bank total cost; y_{it} and w_{it} indicate vectors of output and input prices; we specify equity (E) as a quasi-fixed input to control for differences in risk
preferences, which may arise due to regulation, financial distress, or informational asymmetries; β is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The
 two-sided random error term v_{it} is assumed to be independent of the non-negative cost efficiency variable u_{it} and is assumed to follow a
symmetric normal distribution around the frontier and ui, accounts for the firm's inefficiency and is assumed to follow a half-normal distribution.
Detailed results of each prospective M&A scenario regarding both the `Could Exist (if recent M&As were different)' and `Potential' category in the Greek
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Table 4.a: Table: UK - Unit root analysis of the variables used in the stress test scenario
d Catfat Ceff d TPL
Method Statistic P-value Statistic P-value Statistic P-value
ADF - Fisher Chisquare 88.4526 0,000 41.2944 0,000 33.5951 0,000
PP - Fisher Chisquare 109.4665 0,000 49.1568 0,000 38.6641 0,000
d GDP d Real EER d 3M Tbill
Method Statistic P-value Statistic P-value Statistic P-value
ADF - Fisher Chisquare 162.1645 0,000 77.5161 0,000 66.2547 0,000
PP - Fisher Chisquare 241.5746 0,000 104.2543 0,000 95.2544 0,000
as the UK banking sector is concerned. Specifically,  'd Catfat', 'd TPL',  'd GDP', 'd Real EER' and 'd 3M Tbill' refer to the first differences of Liquidity Creation,
Total Problem Loans, Gdp Growth Rate, Real Effective Exchange Rate and Three month treasury bill rate respectively, while 'Ceff' refers to the cost efficiency score.
Notes: This table reports the empirical estimates of the unit root analysis on the variables that were considered in the panel vector autoregressive system (PVAR) as far
Constant and Trend included in the model
d Catfat Ceff d TPL
Method Statistic P-value Statistic P-value Statistic P-value
ADF - Fisher Chisquare 59.2898 0,000 13.3426 0,000 9.1028 0,000
PP - Fisher Chisquare 86.4639 0,000 22.6894 0,000 14.8929 0,000
d GDP d Real EER d 3M Tbill
Method Statistic P-value Statistic P-value Statistic P-value
ADF - Fisher Chisquare 124.9676 0,000 36.1855 0,000 37.0507 0,000
PP - Fisher Chisquare 211.5184 0,000 61.4127 0,000 64.7155 0,000
as the Greek banking sector is concerned. Specifically,  'd Catfat', 'd TPL',  'd GDP', 'd Real EER' and 'd 3M Tbill' refer to the first differences of Liquidity Creation,
Total Problem Loans, Gdp Growth Rate, Real Effective Exchange Rate and Three month treasury bill rate respectively, while 'Ceff' refers to the cost efficiency score.
Table 4.b: Table: Greece - Unit root analysis of the variables used in the stress test scenario
Constant and Trend included in the model
Notes: This table reports the empirical estimates of the unit root analysis on the variables that were considered in the panel vector autoregressive system (PVAR) as far
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Table 5: Liquidity Creation - Variance Decompositions
UK
d_catfat2 ceff d_TPL2 dGdP d_Real_EER d_3M_Tbill
d_catfat2 10 0.78493406 0.04171584 0.11601967 0.01612504 0.00167409 0.03953131
d_catfat2 20 0.78493398 0.04171584 0.11601967 0.01612504 0.00167412 0.03953135
d_catfat2 30 0.78493398 0.04171584 0.11601967 0.01612504 0.00167412 0.03953135
Greece BEFORE the recent consolidation activity
d_catfat2 ceff d_TPL2 dGdP d_Real_EER d_3M_Tbill
d_catfat2 10 0.80889784 0.0134512 0.13678105 0.00436625 0.00224342 0.03426025
d_catfat2 20 0.80887736 0.01346604 0.13678158 0.00436657 0.00224787 0.03426058
d_catfat2 30 0.80887619 0.01346662 0.13678185 0.00436659 0.00224809 0.03426066
Greece AFTER the recent consolidation activity
d_catfat2 ceff d_TPL2 dGdP d_Real_EER d_3M_Tbill
d_catfat2 10 0.76155485 0.00393531 0.19510167 0.00033914 0.00004538 0.03902365
d_catfat2 20 0.761545 0.00395142 0.19509328 0.00033949 0.00004988 0.03902093
d_catfat2 30 0.7615442 0.00395189 0.19509325 0.0003395 0.00005011 0.03902105
This table reports the variance decompositions of Liquidity Creation with respect to a Bank, a
Macroeconomic and a Financial shock, deriving from the panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) system
for both the UK and Greek baseline scenario where there is no bank consolidation activity in the sector
 and the additional baseline scenario that indicates the current conditions of the Greek banking system
after the recent wave of Greek banks' M&As. Specifically, 'd Catfat2', 'd TPL',  'd GDP', 'd Real EER' and
d 3M Tbill' refer to the first differences of Liquidity Creation, Total Problem Loans ( i.e. Bank shock), Gdp
Growth Rate (i.e. Macroeconomic shock), Real Effective Exchange Rate (i.e. Financial shock) and Three
month treasury bill rate (i.e. Financial shock) respectively, while 'Ceff' refers to the cost efficiency score
( i.e. Bank shock). The total effect accumulated is reported over 10, 20 and 30 years.
Table 6: Cost Efficiency - Variance Decompositions
UK
d_catfat2 ceff d_TPL2 dGdP d_Real_EER d_3M_Tbill
ceff 10 0.21495877 0.31843069 0.31431747 0.01811352 0.05647597 0.07770357
ceff 20 0.21332242 0.31343812 0.31877367 0.01763171 0.05847431 0.07835977
ceff 30 0.21324806 0.31321167 0.318976 0.01760985 0.05856497 0.07838946
Greece BEFORE the recent consolidation activity
d_catfat2 ceff d_TPL2 dGdP d_Real_EER d_3M_Tbill
ceff 10 0.13958527 0.42648238 0.24301 0.02160677 0.0769042 0.09241137
ceff 20 0.13438309 0.42511087 0.24650601 0.0213031 0.0804462 0.09225072
ceff 30 0.13412232 0.42503868 0.24668334 0.02128799 0.08062535 0.09224233
Greece AFTER the recent consolidation activity
d_catfat2 ceff d_TPL2 dGdP d_Real_EER d_3M_Tbill
ceff 10 0.16024421 0.31277699 0.28216 0.01264193 0.11817795 0.11399892
ceff 20 0.15620581 0.31057 0.28393777 0.01248 0.12229427 0.11451215
ceff 30 0.15605264 0.31014 0.28434267 0.01247369 0.12246123 0.11452977
This table reports the variance decompositions of Cost Efficiency with respect to a Bank, a
Macroeconomic and a Financial shock, deriving from the panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) system
for both the UK and Greek baseline scenario where there is no bank consolidation activity in the sector
 and the additional baseline scenario that indicates the current conditions of the Greek banking system
after the recent wave of Greek banks' M&As. Specifically, 'd Catfat2', 'd TPL',  'd GDP', 'd Real EER' and
d 3M Tbill' refer to the first differences of Liquidity Creation, Total Problem Loans ( i.e. Bank shock), Gdp
Growth Rate (i.e. Macroeconomic shock), Real Effective Exchange Rate (i.e. Financial shock) and Three
month treasury bill rate (i.e. Financial shock) respectively, while 'Ceff' refers to the cost efficiency score
( i.e. Bank shock). The total effect accumulated is reported over 10, 20 and 30 years.
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Table 7.a: UK: Half - Life & Total Effect after all three shocks
Macroeconomic Shock Financial Shock Bank Shock
Half Life
(years)
Total Effect
(abs. values
%)
Half Life
(years)
Total Effect
(abs. values
%)
Half Life
(years)
Total Effect
(abs. values
%)
Banking System without any M&A 2.651 9.531 1.963 5.234 1.767 4.149
Banking System with Potential M&A
Financial Institution 1 Financial Institution 2 Financial Institution 3
_1 HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 1.415 5.574 0.687 2.247 0.579 2.317
_2 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc 1.274 4.348 0.574 2.695 0.472 1.884
_3 HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 1.327 4.912 0.698 2.781 0.514 2.142
_4 HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Santander UK Plc 1.317 4.774 0.576 2.754 0.497 1.945
_5 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 1.482 7.156 0.679 3.014 0.546 2.689
_6 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc 1.289 4.782 0.579 2.524 0.513 2.063
_7 HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 1.267 4.431 0.537 2.246 0.415 1.289
_8 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc 1.243 4.317 0.528 2.197 0.423 1.374
_9 Barclays Bank Plc Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 1.273 4.371 0.581 2.576 0.464 1.714
_10 HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc 1.297 4.782 0.591 2.768 0.472 1.63
_11 HSBC Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 1.301 5.379 0.608 2.943 0.487 1.671
_12 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 1.251 4.387 0.536 2.297 0.427 1.344
_13 Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 1.342 5.038 0.624 3.072 0.514 1.749
_14 Barclays Bank Plc Standard Chartered Bank 1.304 4.864 0.614 3.173 0.519 1.949
_15 Barclays Bank Plc Santander UK Plc 1.287 4.643 0.597 3.067 0.504 1.884
This table demonstrate those UK prospective combinations of banks' M&A which form a banking sector whose half-life and total effect after all three different types of shocks
 (i.e Macroeconomic, Financial, Bank) with respect to  its 'liquidity creation',  is less than the respective ones which derive from a banking system without the presence
of those specific potential banks' consolidation activities.
Table 7.b: Greece: Half - Life & Total Effect after all three shocks
Macroeconomic Shock Financial Shock Bank Shock
Half Life
(years)
Total Effect
(abs. values %)
Half Life
(years)
Total Effect
(abs. values %)
Half Life
(years)
Total Effect
(abs. values %)
Banking system Before  recent consolidation activity without any M&A 2.914 17.165 2.557 16.048 1.902 14.165
Banking system Before  recent consolidation activity with Potential M&A
_1 ETHNIKI-AEGEAN 1.598 11.745 0.738 10.314 0.574 8.687
_2 ETHNIKI-PANCREATAN 1.645 12.186 0.791 11.183 0.607 8.988
_3 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK 1.481 10.946 0.677 9.912 0.512 7.841
_4 ETHNIKI-PROBANK 1.694 12.357 0.804 11.008 0.613 9.265
_5 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN 1.254 9.864 0.548 9.194 0.468 8.191
_6 ETHNIKI-FBB 1.671 12.684 1.048 11.544 0.797 9.384
_7 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN 1.487 11.493 0.867 10.992 0.662 9.461
_8 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANCRETAN 1.569 11.717 0.924 11.472 0.704 9.965
_9 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANCRETAN 1.347 10.468 0.716 9.918 0.517 8.716
_10 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 1.378 11.064 0.847 11.911 0.684 9.684
_11 ALPHA-PANCREATAN 1.617 12.397 1.041 11.986 0.791 10.411
_12 ALPHA-AEGEAN 1.571 12.078 0.976 11.502 0.804 10.485
_13 ALPHA-EMPORIKI 1.643 12.755 1.073 13.411 0.701 9.842
Banking system After  recent consolidation activity without any M&A 2.682 21.597 1.166 12.573 1.921 18.208
Banking system After  recent consolidation activity with Potential M&A
_1 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK 2.316 14.699 0.177 7.412 1.613 16.265
_2 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN 2.186 13.937 0.048 6.694 1.775 17.214
_3 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN 2.379 15.522 0.367 8.492 1.662 16.461
_4 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANCRETAN 2.461 16.691 0.424 8.972 1.704 16.965
_5 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANCRETAN 2.287 14.462 0.216 7.418 1.517 15.716
_6 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 2.428 15.923 0.347 9.411 1.684 16.684
_7 ALPHA-EMPORIKI 2.583 18.461 0.573 10.911 1.701 16.842
This table demonstrate those Greek prospective combinations of banks' M&A which form a banking sector whose half-life and total effect after all three different types of shocks
(i.e Macroeconomic, Financial, Bank) with respect to its 'liquidity creation',  is less than the respective ones which derive from a banking system without the presence of those
specific potential banks' consolidation activities. Results are reported for both states of the Greek banking sector, i.e. with and without accounting for the recent wave of M&As.
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